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Scope and scale of the study
The data for this global study of the non-life 
reinsurance sector is unique. It is based on 
ethnographic observation of reinsurance trading, 
broking, client meetings and conferences, as well 
as in-depth interviewing of key participants in the 
reinsurance industry over three annual cycles 
from 2009-2012. The data set comprises 837 
ethnographic observations and 446 interviews, 
collected in 22 reinsurance and broking irms and 
36 insurance irms across 17 countries and 61 
ofices in all non-life lines of business. We thank the 
industry for the generosity and transparency that 
has made the analysis in this report possible. 
1Executive summary
This report is the result of a three-year study of 
the global reinsurance industry, covering the main 
stakeholders of cedents, reinsurers, and brokers. 
It examines the implications of profound change 
arising from shifts in regulation, consolidation in the 
key players, and increasing competition both within 
the reinsurance industry and from alternative capital 
providers. These changes are driving convergence 
in a market that was, until recently, characterised 
by signiicant cultural variation in buying and 
selling reinsurance. The indings in this report will 
help industry participants to take stock of their 
current position in the industry, the speciic types of 
differentiation available, and how these differentiators 
can create advantage. Speciically, the report provides 
evidence-based frameworks and models that irms 
can use to diagnose their existing strategies and 
structures and consider alternatives.
The report has six sections. Section 1 is a call to 
arms about the current state of the industry. Section 
2 differentiates between ive main types of cedents 
according to their need for capital, the products that 
they purchase and the extent to which they centralise 
reinsurance buying. It shows that consolidation of 
cedents into a number of key global players has 
generated a trend towards centralised and global 
reinsurance purchasing. This has two key implications. 
First, centralised retention typically reduces the 
amount cedents spend on their reinsurance, 
contributing to a reported stasis in the global premium 
ceded to the reinsurance industry. Second, global 
purchasing is shifting towards large, multi-territory 
programmes that are not closely connected to the 
primary insurance industry, which lowers the overall 
transparency of reinsurance products. These two 
changes are eroding traditional beliefs about long-
term relationships and continuity of cover, in favour 
of more opportunistic and cost-effective business 
relationships.
Section 3 examines reinsurers. Consolidation has 
created larger reinsurers that compete for market 
share, even as new ‘start-up’ subsidiaries are also 
heightening competitive pressures. While competition 
is becoming iercer, as the pool of reinsurance 
premium remains relatively static and reinsurers 
seek new sources of revenue, reinsurers are not 
yet competing head-to-head. Rather, this section 
differentiates between ive strategic types of reinsurer 
that compete from different technical bases, with 
different strategic appetites and perceptions of 
proitability. We explain the implications of these ive 
strategic types for a irm’s strategy, structure, and 
underwriting processes. Our indings show that 
structural tensions abound as reinsurers expand 
internationally, increasing the cost and complexity of 
their underwriting processes and altering the focus 
of underwriting judgement. The section also outlines 
potential growth trajectories for different strategic 
types, as some strategic positions become more 
crowded. 
Section 4 examines the it between different reinsurer 
and cedent types. It shows that some natural 
sources of it within cedent-reinsurer relationships are 
eroding. Speciically, the shift in premium away from 
local to regional and global programmes generates 
misalignment for many reinsurers. These reinsurers 
need to adapt in order to create better it in the new 
global landscape of centralised reinsurance buying. 
Section 5 examines intermediation. Brokers have 
illustrated their ability to add value by increasing 
penetration within a competitive market. This is 
partially due to the rapid consolidation of brokers 
into three main irms that have the critical mass and 
international reach to offer global services to their 
global clients. In this section we explain how brokers 
add value to both cedents and reinsurers. To expand 
their role, brokers need to generate differentiated 
value-propositions for cedent types and match these 
with different reinsurers’ appetites. They should 
continue to focus on the traditional distribution 
channel and placement services on which they 
receive brokerage, although these services may no 
longer yield the highest rents. Therefore, they need 
to consider how to extract value beyond brokerage 
for other services that they provide, particularly to 
key global cedents and their reinsurers. Generating 
alternative forms of remuneration, such as fee-for-
service, is critical for the future of broking.
Section 6 concludes with a cautionary note about 
some of the trends explained within this report. 
Speciically, while bundling risk into aggregated 
multi-territory covers is eficient, it also increases the 
complexity and global connectivity of reinsurance 
markets and obscures professional judgement. Such 
dynamics have a poor history in other inancial sectors. 
The reinsurance industry has avoided the seduction 
of complex models thus far, retaining underwriter 
judgement alongside increasingly technical evaluation 
of risk. We urge industry participants to be cautious 
in embracing complexity and global connectivity, 
which predisposes an increasing reliance on inancial 
models, and to retain its focus on judgement.
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41. Globalization, convergence and competition: A call to arms
The global reinsurance industry is in a period of 
profound change that is challenging many taken-for-
granted beliefs about buying and selling reinsurance. 
Critically, these changes are accompanied by stasis in 
the amount of reinsurance premium available globally, 
a series of relatively lat market cycles and growing 
competition from alternative sources of capital. This 
report is a call to arms, exhorting cedents, reinsurers 
and brokers to re-evaluate their trading practices 
and more clearly deine their sources of competitive 
advantage. 
There are three main factors driving convergence and 
increasing competition in the reinsurance market. 
First, there are regulatory requirements for global 
equivalence in capital management, leading to greater 
standardization in approaches to capital reserving 
and capital eficiency in both primary insurers and 
reinsurers. 
Second, the growth of vendor property catastrophe 
models has led to greater standardization in the 
evaluation of reinsurance risks in information-rich 
territories such as the USA and much of the UK and 
Western Europe. This has had spill-over effects 
in increasing technicality and search for better 
information in other classes of business and territories. 
Cedents, reinsurers and brokers thus need to have 
greater technical capacity and to take a more analytic 
approach to all classes of business, breaking down 
some prior sources of variation. 
Third, there has been consolidation in cedents, 
reinsurers and brokers. While small and medium-sized 
players remain, a few key players who increasingly 
transact business on a global scale dominate the 
market. In particular, consolidation in the primary 
insurance industry is changing patterns of reinsurance 
buying. Speciically, global and large regional cedents 
are centralising their reinsurance purchasing, with 
shifts in premium from local programmes to bundled 
global programmes and an increase in central 
retention. Such changes reduce their proportion of 
reinsurance spend. 
These drivers of convergence have entered a 
market that was, until recently, characterised by 
signiicant cultural variation in the buying and selling 
of reinsurance.  While some variation remains, it 
is important to take stock of the speciic types of 
differentiation available and how these differentiators 
can create advantage. At the same time, it is important 
to question dominant assumptions about opportunism 
and prevailing myths about long-term business 
relationships, and traditional concepts of payback. As 
globalisation, convergence and competition increase, 
behaviours previously derided as opportunistic are 
being recast as sensible business eficiency. 
It is thus critical for different market participants to 
re-evaluate their practices in order to remain aligned 
with this dynamic global landscape. However, there 
are few evidence-based frameworks available to 
inform them about the scope of global change or its 
potential implications for their business. The aim of this 
report is to outline the key implications of change for 
insurers, reinsurers and brokers and provide a set of 
practical tools that will support them in positioning their 
business in the changing competitive landscape.
52. Who are the buyers and what do they want?
While primary insurance markets vary according to 
their cultural, historical, economic, and political origins, 
reinsurance buying can be clustered according to ive 
types, based on the nature of the parent company. 
Generally, there is a trend across these types towards 
centralised and global reinsurance purchasing. This 
has two key implications for the reinsurance industry. 
First, centralised retention typically reduces the overall 
proportion of reinsurance spend by cedents, so 
contributing to the reported stasis in global premium 
ceded to the reinsurance industry. Second, global 
purchasing changes the reinsurance products from 
local covers to multi-territory programmes that are not 
closely connected to the primary insurance industry 
being covered, lowering the overall transparency of 
reinsurance products.
2.1 Differentiating cedents and their needs 
This section introduces different cedent types, explains 
differences in their reinsurance buying strategies, and 
outlines the implications of these for both cedents and 
reinsurers.
2.1.1 Five strategic buyer types
While primary insurance markets vary, reinsurance 
buying patterns can be clustered into ive types 
according to parent company characteristics: Global, 
Regional, Local, Emerging Market and Specialty Lines 
buyers.  Each type exempliies particular strategies 
of reinsurance buying according to their different 
needs. As shown in the Cedent Positioning Cube 
(Figure 2.1) cedents differ on three related dimensions 
that emphasize different priorities in the purpose, 
products and organization of reinsurance buying: (1) 
degree of capitalisation; (2) bundling of the products 
purchased; and (3) need for coordination of buying. 
Taken together, these three dimensions also indicate 
potential trajectories for reinsurance buying as irms 
grow and mature.
Key points: Reinsurer buyers
•	 There are five cedent types that differ in their 
reinsurance buying strategies according to their 
capitalisation, need for coordination, and 
product bundling
•	 There is a general trend for larger cedents to 
centralise reinsurance buying decisions, 
centralise retention, and bundle risk into multi-
territory products, which reduces their 
proportion of reinsurance spend
•	 Traditional beliefs about personal relationships 
and continuity of cover are eroding in favour of  
cost-effective business relationships
•	 These changes are increasing opportunism in 
buying reinsurance
•	 In a more opportunistic marketplace, cedents 
can enhance their attractiveness to reinsurers 
by managing their information quality and 
programme transparency, within the context of 
their market maturity
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62. Who are the buyers and what do they want? (cont.)
Capitalisation: The purpose of reinsurance is to 
support risk transfer from the cedent to the reinsurer 
through the provision of capital. Hence, the level of 
capitalisation in cedents inluences their reinsurance 
needs. Well-capitalised insurers, particularly those 
with high capital eficiency arising from well-diversiied 
portfolios, do not need reinsurance to grow or to 
alleviate overall volatility of the risk portfolio. Rather, 
they require it to cover peak risk. By contrast, less well-
capitalised players require reinsurance as a source of 
affordable capital, enabling them to grow. In particular, 
transferring risk via reinsurance reduces the amount 
of capital they need to hold in order to stay aloat or 
realise their ambitions for growth. Hence, by proxy, 
buying reinsurance is an affordable way of freeing up 
or accessing more capital. Reinsurance thus needs to 
compete as a cost effective source of capital with both 
other forms of access to capital and also with a irm’s 
own capitalisation.
While larger, more diversiied insurers are typically 
more capitalised than smaller, or emerging market 
buyers, some features of ownership structure, such 
as public ownership or mutual ownership, also affect 
the need for capital. For example, mutuals are more 
dependent on reinsurance as a source of capital 
because they do not have the same access to capital 
as listed companies.
Product bundling: The extent to which reinsurance 
products are bundled and the form that bundling 
takes are a feature of a cedent’s size, complexity 
and capitalisation. At one end, small insurance irms 
bundle different lines into a single product: Such as 
a bouquet of motor, property, ire and engineering 
risks. Even where lines are presented separately 
there may be an expectation that they will be 
written on a whole account basis, with the reinsurer 
required to take an equal share across all lines and 
layers. This is known as heterogeneous bundling 
because the ceded programme contains multiple 
different, or heterogeneous, risks. The reason for 
heterogeneous bundling is that the cedent has some 
small programmes that would not be viable as stand-
alone programmes, or are not attractive on their 
own, but may be traded in a bundle with other risks. 
Thus, heterogeneous bundling is an eficient method 
of risk transfer, which remains popular with small 
domestic and emerging-market insurance irms. 
While it is complex for reinsurers to evaluate precisely 
the different risks being transferred, the amount of 
premium required is typically relatively small, and the 
product is often purchased on a quota share basis. 
As insurance irms become larger and more mature, 
they tend to ‘un-bundle’ their products. That is, as 
they develop suficiently large programmes, they 
trade these on a stand-alone, line-by-line basis. Such 
programmes are typically single territory, or combine 
a few similar territories, for the cover of a single type 
of risk, such as a third party motor liability product, or 
a Cat cover. The products are generally simpler and 
more transparent than bundled products.
At the other extreme, large insurance companies 
with accumulations of a particular type of risk, favour 
bundling this into a multiple territory programme. 
For example, all Cat risk from property, marine, 
etc., is pulled together across territories into a single 
bundled programme, such as a Pan-European, or 
USA nationwide cover, or an even wider cover, such 
as the regional and global aggregates and so-called 
Super-Cat products purchased by large multinational 
insurers. This is known as homogenous bundling 
because the programme contains a single type of risk. 
These risks are typically placed on an excess of loss 
basis and are popular with large cedents because they 
enable capital and resource eficiency in purchasing 
cover and support the transfer of peak risk. However, 
homogenously bundled risk is complex to evaluate. 
For example, such programmes may combine mature 
and less developed markets, each of which has 
variable information quality about the precise nature of 
the risk in that territory. Similarly, the capital eficiency 
assumptions that underlie the bundling of different 
territories may not be clear.
Need for coordination: The need for coordination is a 
function of the cedent’s size and scope. For example, 
those diversiied multinational insurance companies 
that are ‘household names’ around the world need to 
formally coordinate their reinsurance buying across 
its local operating companies (LOCs). Coordination of 
reinsurance buying enables capital eficiency through 
diversiication, avoids duplication as a irm expands 
by acquisition, and ensures that a group has oversight 
of, and is adequately hedged for, risk taken in local 
operating companies (LOCs). High levels of formal 
coordination are particularly necessary for bundling 
homogenous risks across multiple LOCs, such as 
aggregated catastrophe covers. Smaller companies, 
and companies with fewer product lines and territories 
to cover, have fewer opportunities for capital eficiency 
and less need for formal coordination of reinsurance 
buying.  Rather, reinsurance buying may be more 
easily overseen by a small number of key people who 
are close to the original business for which reinsurance 
is sought. Generally, the greater a irm’s need for 
coordination, the higher the tendency to centralise 
reinsurance buying decisions, centralise retention, and 
bundle homogenous products. 
72. Who are the buyers and what do they want? (cont.)
2.1.2 Variation in cedent types
As displayed in the Cedent Positioning Cube, there 
are ive main types of reinsurance buyers that vary 
according to their capitalisation, need for coordination, 
and type of product bundling: Emerging Market, Local, 
Regional, Global and Specialty Lines Buyers.
Emerging Market Buyers are not necessarily small. 
However, they typically have lower need for formal 
coordination because: i) they are less likely to have a 
highly diversiied or complex portfolio of risks, as many 
products are not in demand in the 
primary market; ii) they tend to 
operate in a single territory or small 
number of similar territories.  Most 
Emerging Market Buyers require 
reinsurance for access to capital 
and to alleviate the volatility of their 
portfolio as a whole, because they 
operate on relatively small margins 
and reserves. Commensurate with 
their need for capital, they tend to 
favour quota share products and 
heterogeneous product bundling, 
such as bouquets and whole 
account cover. 
Local Buyers are cedents that retain strong domestic 
market afiliation and usually purchase local covers 
as stand-alone programmes. They have relatively low 
need for formal, centralised coordination. While they 
may develop multiple lines of business, their size and 
scope enables reinsurance buying to remain within a 
relatively small span of central oversight and control. 
As they develop suficient size and/or maturity, they 
unbundle bouquet products, developing stand-alone 
products, such as separate motor, property and other 
programmes. Because of their size, Local Buyers tend 
not to have high capital eficiency and reinsurance 
remains a necessary source of capital to support risk 
transfer and irm viability.  
Regional Buyers are cedents that have extended 
beyond their domestic market to include surrounding 
regions, leading them to buy regional rather than 
predominantly local risk covers. While these may be 
cedents operating across multiple countries within a 
region, such as Europe, in large countries with diverse 
exposure to perils, such as the USA, a nationwide 
company should also be considered a Regional 
Buyer because it covers multiple territories and 
perils that diversify exposure. Regional Buyers have 
more complex divisional structures that necessitate 
coordination of reinsurance buying. They also have 
the scale to sustain a central reinsurance buying 
department and, with increasing diversiication, greater 
capital eficiency and, potentially, capitalisation to 
retain a greater share of their risk. However, need for 
capital may vary according to whether reinsurance is 
seen as a cost effective form of capital enabling growth 
into new territories. As Regional Buyers grow, their 
individual lines of business generate suficient volume 
to be bundled across different territories.  Therefore, 
there is a shift from stand-alone lines to homogenous 
products, such as Pan-European covers or, for regions 
such as the USA, multi-peril nationwide covers. 
Global Buyers are at the peak of all three dimensions 
of the Cedent Positioning Cube. They have high need 
for coordination because of the diverse territories and 
lines of business covered and their complex multi-
divisional structure. They thus beneit from centralised 
reinsurance buying. As they have high capital eficiency 
arising from diversiication, as well as the size and 
scope to retain a signiicant amount of their risk, 
access to capital is not a key driver 
of reinsurance buying. Rather, 
reinsurance is seen as a means 
of securing cover for peak risk. 
As part of their trend for capital 
eficiency and central coordination, 
Global Buyers tend to bundle 
homogenous risks across 
territories, developing regional or 
global catastrophe and per-risk 
programmes.
Specialty Lines Buyers are those cedents that are 
only in specialty areas, such as credit and surety, 
agriculture, marine or aviation. While they are often 
part of a multi-line insurer, they are separated for 
reinsurance purchasing to accommodate their 
requirement for specialised underwriting expertise. 
They have been partially separated in our analysis 
because they have some different purposes and needs 
from other cedents. Depending on their size, market 
maturity and parental structure, they may differ along 
the three dimensions. Hence, they are not a true ‘type’ 
but may relect characteristics of one of the other 
types. Nonetheless, they typically have relatively low 
coordination needs compared to Regional or Global 
Buyers, buy stand-alone programmes, and tend to 
purchase products such as quota share (QS) that are 
typically associated with access to capital.
As shown by the arrows in Figure 2.1, these types also 
represent a trajectory for reinsurance buying as irms 
grow and mature. For example, as Emerging Market 
Buyers mature they may become Local Buyers, while 
growth may turn them into Regional or Global Buyers. 
“We don’t buy 
proportional; they’re 
fundamentally 
capital support. We 
don’t need capital 
support; we have 
huge access to the 
capital markets. 
Any time we want 
money we just 
put up a hand.”
(Global Buyer)
“We prefer 
proportional; we 
think it’s safer. It’s 
been a natural 
progression 
starting with quota 
share and a quota 
share surplus. It 
feeds confidence 
in being able to 
write the business 
and yet still having 
the protection 
of a proportional 
treaty.”
(Emerging 
Market Buyer)
82. Who are the buyers and what do they want? (cont.)
Currently, the most evident trend on this trajectory is 
the shift towards Regional and Global Buyers, arising 
from a combination of acquisition and organic growth.
2.1.3 Reinsurance buying purpose and products
While any speciic irm will vary a little from the types 
illustrated in the Cedent Positioning Cube, a cedent 
that is ‘true’ to type will cluster around some buying 
strategies as opposed to others. For example, a 
cedent seeking reinsurance as a primary source 
of capital is likely to also purchase proportional 
products. These clusters are illustrated in the Cedent 
Purpose and Product Chart (Figure 2.2), which shows 
that Global and Emerging Market Buyers cluster 
at opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of their 
reinsurance buying purposes and products. 
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Figure 2.2 Cedent Purpose and Product Chart: Who is Buying What?
Key implications of buyer types
•	 Consolidation is generating a trend towards 
large, complex Global Buyers
•	 The larger and more complex a cedent is, the 
more centralised its reinsurance buying and the 
more that it tends towards homogenous 
bundled products 
•	 Homogenously bundled products are complex 
because they are not connected to any specific 
local market and the assumptions about the 
different primary markets on which they are 
based may not be transparent
•	 As large diversified cedents are better able to 
retain their risk, reinsurance increasingly needs 
to compete as a cost-effective source of capital 
with a Global Buyer’s own capitalisation
92. Who are the buyers and what do they want? (cont.)
Purpose indicates the degree 
to which reinsurance buying 
is driven by access to capital 
and/or the need to alleviate 
volatility of risk. The distinction 
between peak risk and portfolio 
risk also differentiates Global 
and Regional Buyers who can 
retain a reasonable level of 
portfolio volatility from Local and 
Emerging Market Buyers who 
lack the capitalization and capital 
eficiency to do so. While Local 
and Emerging Market Buyers 
tend towards the right-hand side of the diagram, the 
extent to which they are reliant on reinsurance to trade 
is also a useful indicator of their overall viability.
Products refers to the predominance of non-
proportional - typically excess of loss (XL) - and 
proportional - typically quota share (QS) - products 
favoured by cedent types, and is associated with 
access to capital.  While Emerging Market Buyers 
typically buy QS in order to access capital on a 
partnering basis, their ability to grow their business and 
transition to XL, at least on some lines, is an indication 
of internal underwriting discipline and growing maturity. 
Local Buyers and, to a lesser extent, Regional Buyers, 
tend towards QS, particularly if they are mutual 
Regional Buyers, particularly where they are mutual 
insurance companies that are restricted in their ability 
to raise capital by other means. Specialty Lines Buyers 
are a separate case, as they are predominantly a QS 
market.
‘Bundled’ refers to three main patterns discussed 
in Figure 2.1, homogenous (e.g. Super Cat), stand-
alone, and heterogeneous (e.g. bouquet) products. 
In particular, consistent with the trend to Global 
and Regional Buyers, there is a growing class of 
products that arises from centralised buyers bundling 
homogenous products, particularly catastrophe 
exposure, into large and complex regional or global 
covers. These products are one of the fundamental 
changes arising from consolidation in the primary 
insurance industry. 
‘Alternatives’ refer to a range of primarily collateralised 
market products, such as swaps, Cat bonds, and 
Insurance Linked Securities (ILS), which are currently 
seen as a supplement to, but not a substitute for, 
reinsurance. While they are not usually particular 
enough to Specialty Line Buyers’ needs and are 
beyond the requirements of most Emerging Market 
and Local Buyers, they are attractive to those needing 
capacity, such as Global and, to a lesser extent, 
Regional Buyers. They represent a growing class of 
products that provide viable cover. In particular, the 
amount of Cat capacity required to meet the demands 
of bundled homogenous products increases the 
comparison with and potential substitution from 
collateralised market products. They thus represent 
a threat to the amount of premium placed through 
reinsurance programmes.
2.1.4 Coordinating reinsurance buying
As the Reinsurance Procurement Chart (Figure 2.3 
overleaf) shows, the way that reinsurance buying is 
coordinated affects the level of retention, the quality 
of information and the level of decision-making. As 
Specialty Lines Buyers relect the buying patterns 
of various types, they are not considered separately 
in these results. This section explains some of the 
choices available to cedents in deciding how to 
coordinate their reinsurance buying. 
Centralisation: Due to their 
need for coordination, Global 
and Regional Buyers typically 
have a very centralised approach 
to buying reinsurance through 
a central reinsurance division. 
These reinsurance divisions vary 
in type and may include one or more of the following 
structures: A captive; a reinsurance proit and loss 
division; or a service centre. Such divisions are often 
larger than many of the reinsurers with which they 
trade. Centralised buying involves assuming risk from 
the local operating companies (LOCs), retaining some 
proportion at the centre, and ceding the remainder to 
the reinsurance market, which can vary in the following 
ways: (i) transfer some of the risk to the open market 
in bundled homogenous programmes, so transforming 
the original local risk covers into a multi-territory 
group risk cover; and/or (ii) take a share of all the local 
programmes centrally and cede the remainder of each 
to the reinsurance market within each local territory; 
and/or iii) leave some covers as stand-alone local 
programmes where there are pricing beneits, or where 
it is required by local regulators.
Retention: Organizing reinsurance buying is not 
simply a matter of coordination but also of maximising 
the capital eficiency gained from group diversiication. 
This is done by centralising decisions about the level 
of retention. Global and Regional Buyers make central 
decisions about retention, even where LOCs are able 
to purchase their own cover. Local and Emerging 
Market Buyers generally have local retentions, both by 
virtue of their local scope, and their primary concerns 
“They start as risk 
traders; they don’t 
carry a lot of risk. Their 
retentions are very low. 
They are putting less 
of their own money on 
the risk. That’s why I 
call them risk traders 
rather than risk carriers. 
They take risks with 
the understanding 
that those risks are 
poor, but because they 
are highly reinsured 
they don’t care”.
(Reinsurer)
“Fragmented buying 
is just inefficient; 
they’re spending a 
lot more than if they 
did it smarter”.
(Global Buyer)
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Figure 2.3 Reinsurance Procurement Chart
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with risk transfer, rather than capital 
eficiency. Centralised buying 
typically raises the amount of risk 
retained and reduces the premium 
ceded to the reinsurance industry.
Information: Generally, the more 
centralised the buying, such as in 
Global and Regional Buyers, the 
better the quality of information 
underpinning the reinsurance 
programme. This is because the 
internal reinsurance division has to 
assume a proportion of the risk from the LOCs and so 
has both access to data and a vested interest in the 
quality of information being received. Hence, while 
the bundled homogenous covers that these cedents 
purchase are complex, they should also be built on 
sound information, which may mitigate some of their 
problems with transparency and lack of connection to 
the underlying primary risk. Local Buyers often have 
good information about their own programmes by 
virtue of their closeness to the underlying business, 
even where they are not in information-rich territories. 
Emerging Market Buyers typically lack the data 
capture systems for collecting primary insurance data 
and developing it into robust reinsurance information, 
particularly where the underlying market is subject to 
rapid change. Quality of information can thus be a key 
differentiator in selecting these buyers. 
Decision-making authority: Generally, reinsurance 
buying is shifting from individual decision-making to 
committee decision-making, which is also shifting the 
nature of reinsurance relationships from personal to 
business-to-business relationships. All reinsurance 
buyers are required to justify their purchasing 
decisions, both in terms of cost effectiveness and 
extent of risk cover. In Global and Regional Buyers, 
this decision is usually made as part of a group risk or 
senior executive committee. Hence, the reinsurance 
buyer is a key person in the decision chain but is rarely 
the sole decision maker. By contrast, the reinsurance 
manager in a Local Buyer will often have signiicant 
decision-making authority. For Emerging Market 
Buyers the cost of reinsurance is a key constraint on 
the buyer’s decision-making authority, as reinsurance 
rates must relect the proitability of the underlying 
primary insurance market, even where this is dificult 
to balance with the need for risk transfer. Hence, the 
perception that the lowest price is the best price in 
emerging markets. 
“They went from 
buying proportional 
to non-prop and 
stopped ceding 
treaties from local 
operating entities.  
A lot of meat from 
the bone was gone 
for us; we lost 50% 
of our premium 
just due to this”. 
(Reinsurer on 
cedent’s shift to 
central retention)
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2.2 Busting myths: What do cedents really want?
These changes in reinsurance buying dispel 
some myths about relationships and continuity 
on which the reinsurance industry has been built. 
Speciically, consolidation in the primary insurance 
industry is leading to a more pragmatic approach to 
reinsurance relationships, which is sometimes termed 
opportunistic. Hence, while opportunistic behaviour 
has previously been considered an industry ‘taboo’, 
large cedents that cede high-volume premium are 
increasingly opportunistic in their reinsurance buying in 
all but their most core partnerships.
2.2.1 Cedent requirements from reinsurers
The Reinsurer Service Segmentation Chart (Figure 
2.4) shows what cedents require from their reinsurers. 
Those items at the bottom right of 
the igure – such as claims history 
– are prerequisites, required by 
all cedents. The other items – 
such as training and ratings – are 
differentiators, meaning that cedent 
types have different requirements 
that allow reinsurers to develop 
competencies and tailor their 
offering to those cedents. These 
differentiators should, however, be 
taken with some caution; they are 
price dependent and must meet the 
terms of a consensus market. Hence, in the current 
world of ample capacity and ierce competition to 
provide capital from within and outside the reinsurance 
industry, price is also a critical differentiator.
While all reinsurers need to provide the prerequisite 
factors, they simply enable them to be in the game. 
For example, paying reinsurance claims is critical and 
neither a high security rating nor superior technical 
“Price is one of the 
most important 
things for me. 
Because I think it 
could be cheaper. 
I have to explain 
to my clients, my 
business unit why 
they have to pay 
so much money 
for a reinsurance 
contract.”  
(Cedent)
Ratings
Greater Scope 
For Targeted 
Differentiation
Prerequisites 
(Expected By 
All Cedents)
Technical Ability
Analytics
Diversiication
of Panel
Training
Account Exec
Continuity of
Cover
Claims History
Transparent
Offer
Specialist Line
Knowledge
Low Medium High
Figure 2.4 Reinsurer Service Segmentation Chart: What do Cedents Need? 
(Low to high is the strength of the cedent’s need for a particular item from their reinsurers)   
Emerging Buyers
Local & Speciality Buyers
Local & Speciality Buyers
Local & Speciality Buyers
Local & Emerging Buyers
Regional Buyers
Global, Regional &
Emerging Buyers
Global, Regional, Local & 
Speciality Buyers
Local & Speciality Buyers
Global & Regional Buyers
Global & Regional Buyers
Global, Regional, Local & 
Speciality Buyers
Global Buyers
Emerging Buyers
Expected Across All
Cedent Types
Expected Across All
Cedent Types
Emerging Buyers
Emerging Buyers
Global & Regional Buyers
Local, Speciality & 
Emerging Buyers
Key implications of centralised 
reinsurance buying
•	 There is a trend to centralised buying to 
increase efficiency of purchasing
•	 Centralised buying lifts the level of retention, as 
cedents make more effective use of their 
diversification for capital efficiency
•	 Commensurate with this shift, there is also a 
trend to purchasing more complex multi-
territory products
•	 Centralised buying is usually a group rather than 
an individual decision, so emphasising the shift 
from personal to business relationships in the 
reinsurance industry
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ability will compensate for a poor claims history. Yet 
paying claims will not accelerate a reinsurer to the top 
of the list beyond other factors because it is expected 
that reinsurance will provide cover for claims as a base 
condition. Another critical prerequisite is transparency 
of offer. While reinsurers often say that continuity 
of cover is critical ‘for the relationship’, for many 
cedents, particularly those placing big programmes 
with high capacity needs, continuity is less important 
than transparency from their reinsurers; they want 
to know early if the reinsurer intends to withdraw or 
reduce support and why. They are then very pragmatic 
about the business needs of their reinsurers, such as 
needing higher prices than the cedent is willing to pay. 
Indeed, almost all cedents are willing to work with even 
overtly opportunistic reinsurers for capacity purposes, 
providing that is a clear part of their offering, and all 
cedents dislike reinsurers who change their message 
or withdraw cover unexpectedly. 
Differentiators fall into a few broad categories to do 
with security, service and capacity. For example, 
security is critical as a minimum A-rating level is 
required within the governance code of most cedents. 
However security requirements for some Emerging 
Market Buyers are below an A-rating, meaning that 
the top-rated reinsurers may not even see them. 
While additional layers of security, such as the extra 
‘guarantees’ provided by Lloyd’s, provide some 
additional beneit this is not a critical differentiator 
for Global Buyers. Rather, they conduct their own 
internal security ratings, including issues such as 
ratios of risk transfer to capitalisation, calculating the 
amount of risk they are willing to transfer to a reinsurer 
as a percentage of that reinsurer’s capitalisation. 
Furthermore, while diversiied risk transfer has been 
considered important, this is primarily for capacity 
rather than for security reasons. For example, Global 
Buyers irst place much of their cover with 3-5 main 
reinsurers, and then spread the rest across the market 
for capacity rather than diversiication reasons, while 
other buyers diversify primarily to ensure that they are 
not overly dependent on one reinsurer, rather than to 
ensure capital from diverse sources.
Services, such as training, technical ability, specialist 
line knowledge and account executives are variable 
requirements, depending on the cedent’s needs. 
Global Buyers, for example, require reinsurers with 
the technical ability to understand their complex 
programmes but are not typically dependent on 
reinsurers for technical support with structuring 
reinsurance programmes, other than in a few 
exceptional cases of new product development with 
core partners. By contrast, while Emerging Market 
Buyers are more dependent on their reinsurers to 
provide technical support, they typically have less 
information and are in less analysable regions, so that 
technical ability in a reinsurer is not a key differentiator; 
standard technical ability will be suficient to work 
with these buyers. Emerging Market Buyers also 
appreciate services such as training that are not 
needed by Regional and Global Buyers. Finally, while 
cedents enjoy having an account executive appointed 
speciically to their programmes, it is not a differentiator 
on its own but must occur in conjunction with other 
factors. It is primarily beneicial to larger buyers, where 
the complexity of programmes warrants a dedicated 
point of contact from a supplier. Given that services 
come at a cost to reinsurers, it is important that 
they are targeted to areas where they can provide 
opportunities for differentiation and also a return on 
investment.
Two other factors that reinsurers often claim as 
differentiators are relationships and continuity of 
cover. While these are important to cedents, as shown 
in the Partner Prioritisation Chart (Figure 2.5), their 
expectations are in proportion with the importance that 
they accord to the partnership, differentiating between 
core and mid-tier partners and peripheral players. 
For example, the depth (how close the knowledge 
of each other), breadth (multiple points of contact 
in the respective irms), and frequency (number of 
contacts each year) of the relationship are determined 
by segmentation; cedents want to see more of their 
most important reinsurers and are satisied with 
maintenance activities from others. Relationship 
building activities, such as conferences, site visits 
and road-shows, are thus important for reinsurers in 
Signiicance of Cover
(+ e.g. Size, Continuity 
& Breadth)
Closeness of Relationship 
(+ e.g. Frequency, Breadth & Depth)
Low
High
LowHigh
Peripheral
Players
Mid-Tier
Partners
Core
Partners
Figure 2.5 Partner Prioritisation Chart: Core vs. Periphery
2.2.2 Ensuring attractiveness to sellers
As relationships become more focused on cost-
effectiveness, it is critical that cedents ensure that 
their business model is attractive to reinsurers. 
This will enable them to get the best rates in soft 
cycles and to access capacity in hard cycles. The 
Cedent Attractiveness Cube (Figure 2.6) illustrates 
three interrelated indicators, on which cedents may 
assess and enhance their attractiveness: Programme 
transparency, information quality and market maturity. 
Any cedent can improve attractiveness on the irst two 
indicators and also mitigate the effects of low market 
maturity. These indicators are now explained and 
illustrated with some scenarios of how they may be 
combined by different buyer types. 
Programme transparency comprises two 
elements: Year-on-year consistency and technical 
transparency. Year-on-year consistency is important 
because reinsurers dislike ‘smokescreen’ structural 
changes that complicate comparisons, particularly 
after an event, as they generate an impression that 
there is something to hide. The more comparable 
programmes remain across years, the more easily 
reinsurers can evaluate changes in the portfolio and 
ask sensible questions to understand and provide 
adequate risk cover. Technical transparency is equally 
important to facilitate analysis. Programmes that fail 
to deine inclusions and exclusions, conlate multiple 
perils within layers, or have complex wrap-around 
structures obscure the risk being reinsured and 
complicate underwriter analysis. The less transparent 
a programme is, the more broking and negotiation time 
it takes to place. This will make it less eficient for the 
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order to access and understand 
business (see Report 1(1)). However, 
these necessary activities are rarely 
differentiators, particularly for big 
cedents, except with their core 
partners. 
Similarly, issues such as the size 
(amount of capital), continuity 
(renewal of programmes) 
and breadth (across multiple 
programmes) of cover may be 
subsumed within signiicance of 
cover. Provision of signiicant capital 
to a cedent is a differentiator, under 
which issues such as continuity 
of cover also become important. 
Simply, no cedent wants to lose 
a signiicant amount of capital from a core partner 
because this is more dificult to replace. There is, thus, 
a genuine desire to retain continuity of cover with core 
partners, although this is price sensitive. As cedents 
become more centralised in their reinsurance buying 
they are more prone to ‘opportunistic’ purchase, as 
decisions must be justiied with a risk or reinsurance 
committee on the basis of a cost-effective business 
relationship. While cost-effective does not mean 
lowest price, only marginal increases in price can be 
allocated to long-term relationships. Bigger lines or 
better signings for core partners is a way of providing 
value to those business relationships, as are private 
placements. Yet cedents, particularly large buyers, 
are also pragmatic about losing continuity of cover 
and accepting ‘opportunism’ by reinsurers. Indeed, 
while both buyers and sellers have historically seen 
opportunism as a negative behaviour, this view is 
losing validity in the reinsurance industry. Rather, 
sound and transparent business decisions on both 
sides are welcome, so that withdrawal by either party 
on the basis of changing price expectations and 
risk appetites is signalled in a timely fashion prior to 
renewals. 
 (1)  see Report 1 for findings on reinsurer relationship-building (Jarzabkowski et al. 2010. ‘Trading   
 Risks: The value of relationships, models and face-to-face interaction in a global reinsurance   
 market.’ Executive Report: Insurance Intellectual Capital Initiative). 
“You see very 
quickly who are 
really the long-term 
players and who are 
the opportunistic 
ones. You know 
that with some 
players if you have 
the biggest loss 
in history, they will 
still look for the 
cheapest price after 
because they are 
very opportunistic.  
So you have to be 
very opportunistic 
with them or not 
work with them 
at all, otherwise 
there is no fit.”  
(Reinsurer)
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Figure 2.6 Cedent Attractiveness Cube
Key implications for relationships 
and opportunism
•	 Traditional beliefs about reinsurance as a 
relationship and continuity business are eroding 
with all but core partners
•	 Cedent expectations of reinsurers are 
increasingly based on cost-effective business 
relationships with core providers
•	 These changes are leading to a more 
opportunistic environment for reinsurance buying 
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broker to place, decrease the chances that reinsurers 
will understand it, and so reduce the potential panel of 
quality reinsurers. 
Programme transparency is particularly important with 
bundled products that are, by nature, complex. The 
technical transparency of heterogeneous programmes 
can be improved by supplementing this with market 
data, as they typically relect the underlying conditions 
of a speciic primary insurance market. By contrast, 
bundled homogenous programmes 
are not closely linked to the various 
primary insurance markets that 
they cover and so may contain 
unintended surprises for reinsurers. 
Their technical transparency can be 
improved by high quality information 
that clearly shows the assumptions 
about capital eficiency and 
exposure made by the cedent in 
developing the programme. Lack 
of transparency comes at a cost because technical 
reinsurers are likely to load the rate-on-line with 
an ‘uncertainty factor’ to compensate for a lack of 
analysability. 
Information quality is a key dimension of risk 
appraisal. It is measured by accuracy, granularity, and 
veriiability (see Report 1(2)). High quality information 
accurately speciies the value of insured assets; 
for example, a particular cluster of properties in a 
designated area. Granularity relects the level of detail 
with which insured values are covered, for instance, 
whether property values are aggregated by district 
or postcode, helping to improve the accuracy of 
estimates about a potential loss. Veriiability measures 
the extent to which cedent-provided data can be 
cross-checked against information from independent 
sources, such as vendor models, ratings agencies, or 
subscription databases such as Perils®. High quality 
information is also presented in a standardized, easily 
analysable form, which supports 
programme transparency. 
The quality of publically veriiable 
information and the levels of 
granularity available may not be 
fully within a cedent’s control, 
particularly where cedents are in 
less information-rich territories. 
For example, the granularity of 
data within vendor models drops 
steeply outside the USA and a 
select number of mature Western 
markets. However, other measures 
“If the level of 
information is 
really insufficient 
and we don’t feel 
comfortable, then 
we don’t write. I 
would personally 
rather write a 
programme where 
I think it’s too 
cheap but I have 
good access to 
information, than the 
other way around.”  
(Reinsurer) (2) Jarzabkowski et al. 2010.‘Trading Risks The value of relationships, models and face-to-face   
 interaction in a global reinsurance market. ’Executive Report: Insurance Intellectual   
 Capital Initiative.
“We like to think 
there’s lots of 
technical pricing 
going on, but you 
generally have a 
lack of data; a lack 
of transparency 
in the risk you’re 
actually taking.”  
(Reinsurer)
can be taken to improve information quality. For 
example, information about the cedent’s governance, 
portfolio, and underwriting practices can be provided 
and veriied by allowing reinsurers to audit books 
during on-site visits. Additionally, quantitative data can 
be gathered to improve systems and data quality each 
year. Such data can be incorporated into submission 
documents and supplemented by brokers who may 
have additional market data to support cedent-speciic 
material. Cedents can also demonstrate strong 
commitment to information quality by: i) ensuring 
that consistent information is available during every 
meeting with reinsurers (e.g. conference meetings 
should be supported by information on what a cedent 
writes with that reinsurer and how it has performed 
for the reinsurer in previous years); ii) clarifying and 
explaining at submission, if the information provided 
is different from the information given at a conference 
or site visit; and iii) being transparent about gaps in 
information. While these sound like common sense, 
they are often missing from cedents’ programmes. 
Market maturity is strongly correlated with the other 
indicators, because more mature markets have greater 
levels of public information available, including year-
on-year market data, better systems for accessing 
data and greater stability in the market for conducting 
comparisons or analysing the probability of loss. All of 
this increases the accuracy, granularity and veriiability 
of information in mature markets. Higher quality 
information can be converted into more transparent 
programmes. However, this does not automatically 
mean that more mature markets are more attractive 
to sellers. Attractiveness depends on how cedents 
combine the three indicators to be the most attractive 
or ‘best-in-class’ of their type. Below, we suggest 
three scenarios, relating to different levels of market 
maturity, as examples of how buyers may increase 
their attractiveness by improving their performance on 
the other two indicators. 
Combining indicators to increase attractiveness
1. Many mature markets, such as those in Western 
Europe, are saturated with little potential for growth, 
and thin margins for reinsurers. This is particularly 
risky for Local Buyers, as their programmes are 
relatively small, offering negligible premium for many 
reinsurers and modest RoE, particularly during 
a hard cycle. Quite simply, these programmes 
do not look like they provide enough margins to 
offset potential losses. Hence, buyers in these 
markets need to ensure that their comparatively 
as well as access to modelled 
data. By comparison, the 
information they receive from 
Emerging Market Buyers 
seems sparse and may give 
the impression that the cedent 
is hiding something. Providing 
reinsurers with as much 
comparative data as possible 
can counteract deiciencies in 
public information. For example, 
giving as much year-on-year 
data as possible, explaining 
gaps in data and steps taken to address these, 
providing explanations for projected growth, and 
explaining any changes that compensate for 
problems with past performance will heighten 
conidence in the particular cedent. At the same 
time, cooperating to provide wider market data will 
enable reinsurers to perform market comparisons. 
Quality of information and programme transparency 
can enable an Emerging Market Buyer to stand out 
from its peers as a ‘market pick’ for risk transfer. 
Additionally, by sharing data, a buyer can beneit 
from reinsurer knowledge and training and develop 
a closer partnership for product development, which 
may enable them to outperform their peers in the 
primary market. 
In conclusion, no cedent is innately attractive to the 
reinsurer pool, as different reinsurer types have different 
strategic appetites and different perceptions about 
acceptable rates of return. Furthermore, reinsurers 
are hesitant about and/or charge more for products 
that they do not understand. Improving attractiveness 
is within the control of all cedents and will ensure their 
appeal to the widest set of high quality reinsurers.
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low rates are attractive to reinsurers. They do this 
by providing high quality information to show the 
discipline of their underwriting and ability to contain 
losses that would erode the thin margins available 
on their programmes. Such information should 
underpin programme transparency, making it 
possible for reinsurers to better evaluate the rate of 
return against the level of risk.
2. G lobal and Regional Buyers 
are often combining mature 
markets with less developed 
markets and multiple perils 
within a bundled multi-territory 
product. While it is eficient 
for cedents to incorporate 
business from more and less 
analysable markets within a 
single product, these products 
lack transparency to reinsurers; 
as illustrated by the Thai loods 
in 2011, reinsurers do not want 
to ind that covers contain 
surprises of which they were 
unaware. Additionally, the capital 
eficiency assumptions that 
underlie the bundling of different territories may 
not be clear to the reinsurer. They do not want to 
take the cedents’ diversiication model on faith, 
but rather, on transparency of information. This is 
particularly important as many reinsurers allocate 
capacity by territory and so need to know what their 
risk accumulation is for any particular territory, in 
order to understand how a global risk cover affects 
their own capital eficiency and diversiication. 
Hence, it is critical that bundled multi-territory 
and multi-peril products: i) are transparent in 
identifying the different markets within them; ii) 
provide ample information about the types of 
potential risk contained within each market; iii) 
show clearly how information has been gathered 
within those markets; and iv) show how capital 
eficiency and risk diversiication assumptions 
underpin the combining of different territories and 
perils. This will add to programme transparency 
by giving conidence that the quality of information 
underpinning the programme is consistent across 
all markets. 
3. Emerging Market Buyers lack the type of 
information expected by many global reinsurers. 
Additionally, there are few vendor models available 
for such markets. Reinsurers are usually working 
with cedents in data-rich markets, such as the 
USA, where they receive extensive data packs, 
Implications for improving cedent 
attractiveness
•	 Cedent attractiveness to reinsurers arises from 
a combination of programme transparency, 
information quality and market maturity
•	 Improving attractiveness enables a cedent to 
get the best rates from the best reinsurers, 
regardless of the market cycle
•	 Attractiveness of the underlying programme 
becomes more important as traditional notions 
of relationship and business continuity erode 
and are replaced by cost-effective business 
relationships 
“I see a series of the 
same things from 
clients; pushing in 
remote earthquake 
covers. For some 
of these treaties 
we need to get 
rape and pillage 
prices. We need to 
push for significant 
improvements and 
be prepared to walk 
away. Multi-territory 
covers expose us 
to multiple perils. 
We can’t know 
every little exposure 
the client has.”  
(Reinsurer)
“We tell them ‘this 
is a very necessary 
piece of information 
for us and if we 
don’t get the quality 
that we need, then 
we would have to 
reflect that in the 
pricing.’ Whereas 
somebody who 
gives us the full 
transparency, 
you just take it.”  
(Reinsurer)
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2.3 Conclusion: Implications of changing buyer 
behaviour
Our study has noted a number of trends that are 
important in charting the changing landscape of the 
global reinsurance industry. Taken together these 
trends in buyer behaviour provide both valuable 
templates, but also the following four caveats that 
should temper the shift to large-scale homogenised 
products:  
First, centralised buying increases eficiency at the cost 
of reinsurer diversiication. While large programmes 
may require much of the global capacity available, 
so having a large panel of reinsurers, they are also 
complex to write and lack transparency for most 
reinsurers. Hence, signiicant lines are placed with only 
a handful of key reinsurers followed by a high volume 
of smaller reinsurers. This calls into question the 
diversiication of the reinsurance panel, as some 60% 
or more of global programmes may be placed with the 
top 5 reinsurers, leaving relatively small shares among 
the remaining 40-60 smaller reinsurers. There is thus, 
a trade-off between core partnerships with those 
reinsurers who are signiicant capital providers and 
capital lock-in, as signiicant capital providers may be 
hard to replace.
Second, bundling is complex, increases global 
connectivity of markets, and may contain unintended 
‘surprise exposures’. Most reinsurers lack the 
capability to adequately analyse and understand 
such risks. While these reinsurers may write lines 
in softening market cycles, they will be cautious 
of unexpected losses and will focus more on 
understandable business, particularly in hard market 
cycles where they can drive the terms. Hence, it 
is imperative that cedents work on improving the 
attractiveness of their programmes for reinsurance 
providers.
Third, cedents may be unsure of the performance of 
bundled products when they face multiple unexpected 
events in different regions. Hence, the tendency to 
bundling should be tempered with some caution 
about the desired level of complexity for both cedents 
and reinsurers. A series of smaller regional bundles, 
may, for example, be more attractive than a few larger 
bundles for many cedents. 
Fourth, while homogenous, multi-territory product 
bundling is largely a consolidated player phenomenon, 
it provides a possible template for larger Emerging 
Market Buyers as they develop suitable information 
to support these covers. For example, multi-territory, 
multi-peril exposures are also relevant for large buyers 
in China and India, and these may rapidly develop 
covers similar to those purchased by USA nationwide 
insurers. Similarly, Pan-European risk covers may 
provide a model for other regional aggregation of risk 
cover. It will be critical to underpin such programmes 
with high quality information about exposures in, as 
yet, relatively unknown regions.
Summary of key trends in 
reinsurance buying
•	 There is a trend to centralised buying as 
cedents grow and consolidate
•	 Centralisation is associated with a trend to 
bundled homogenous products
•	 Bundled homogenous products remove 
reinsurance premium from local programmes 
into global programmes
•	 The premium available from local programmes 
is declining as corporate parents assume a 
significant percentage of risk from their LOCs 
and Local Buyers are eroded through 
consolidation
•	 Shifting premium into global programmes 
typically reduces the overall amount of premium 
ceded to the reinsurance market
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Competition is becoming increasingly ierce for 
reinsurers. The pool of reinsurance premium available 
globally remains relatively static, while reinsurers 
seek new sources of revenue. Even as the number of 
larger reinsurers has increased through consolidation 
(each with larger market share targets), an increasing 
number of start-up subsidiaries are also increasing 
the competitive pressures. However, our indings 
show that reinsurers are not all competing from the 
same position, or for the same types of reinsurance 
products. Rather, reinsurers can be differentiated 
according to their strategic positions into ive distinct 
strategic types, operating on different strategic 
appetites and perceptions of proitability. This section 
shows the implications of these strategic types for a 
reinsurance irm’s strategy, structure and underwriting 
process. It also outlines potential growth trajectories 
and areas of increasing competition as certain 
strategic spaces become increasingly crowded.
3.1 Strategic types and their different strategic 
positions
While the reinsurance industry traditionally has been 
segmented according to cultural stereotypes about 
Bermudian, Lloyd’s and Continental European 
reinsurance irms, these geographic sources of 
variation are too crude to adequately relect the 
state of global competition. Rather, our research has 
uncovered ive strategic types that compete on the 
basis of distinct business propositions. Although 
market proximity may afford locational advantages 
in accessing business, these strategic types are not 
restricted to any particular geographical region.
3.1.1 Strategic types
Five main types and an additional strategic ploy are 
plotted in the Reinsurer Strategic Positioning Tool 
Key points: Strategic types
•	 There are 5 reinsurer strategic types with 
different strategic propositions based on their 
varying preferences for relationship longevity, 
whole accounts, and technical analysability
•	  While there is increasing competition across the 
market, a reinsurer’s strategic type has 
implications for its strategic appetite and 
primary strategic focus on either cycle 
management or portfolio management
•	 Structural tensions arise as reinsurers grow and 
expand globally, which impinges upon 
underwriter empowerment and judgement
•	 Different strategic types have different 
underwriting processes that have varying 
degrees of trade-off between efficiency, speed 
and client servicing
•	 As reinsurers increasingly write global 
programmes, they need to adjust their approach 
to underwriting and to exposure management, 
which may alter their structures and processes
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(Figure 3.1), according to the emphasis each places 
on three key dimensions of selecting business to 
underwrite: (1) relationship longevity; (2) mono-line or 
multi-line approaches to accounts; and (3) analysability 
of the business. Reinsurance irms’ varying 
prioritization of these dimensions in decision-making 
indicates their different perspectives on proitability and 
different strategic propositions.
Price-Taking Profiteers are 
mono-line reinsurers whose 
strategic proposition is to provide 
capacity where it is needed, 
typically to support US catastrophe 
programmes. This type privileges 
the following in selecting business: 
i) deal proitability; ii) a transactional 
approach, where they are not 
willing to leverage low return 
deals for better ones; for example, 
writing a QS to get on an XL; and 
iii) technical and highly analysable 
business, such as US Cat, which 
has a high RoE. The Price-Taking Proiteer typically 
springs up in a hard cycle to capture value at times 
when the market needs capacity, such as after a 
major event. It is, thus, very focused on short-term 
proitability. However, this approach, which requires 
strict adherence to cycle management, cannot be 
sustained in softer cycles unless the proiteer is 
protected by the capital structure of a corporate 
parent, which enables them to increase and decrease 
capital with the market cycle. Otherwise, Price-Taking 
Proiteers are under pressure during soft cycles to 
either return capital to their investors or morph into 
an alternative strategic type, which may be done 
intentionally as part of a strategy for growth and 
diversiication, or may arise out of strategic drift from 
their hard line on proitability. 
Deal-Making Partners are mono-
line reinsurers with signiicant 
capital whose strategic proposition 
is to develop deals for cedents 
looking for tailored capital 
solutions, typically on catastrophe 
programmes. This strategic type 
privileges the following in selecting 
business: (i) programmes where 
large capacity is needed; (ii) 
discrete deals with good returns, 
where they can put down big lines 
and write close to the risk; (iii) business relationships 
where there is potential for lock-in because of the high 
capital investment required to meet the capacity need 
of a cedent; (iv) very technical and highly analysable 
business with a high RoE, such as big US catastrophe 
programmes or those requiring tailored solutions and 
private deals. While this type provides capital they 
are more than simply a capacity provider due to the 
signiicance of the deals they write, which can include 
taking an entire programme or layer for cedents with 
a particular need. They are, thus, relationship focused, 
within the parameters of their focus on superior 
returns. While there are few Deal-Making Partners, 
they take a disproportionate amount of the global 
premium available due to their business model and the 
capital they can provide.
Patchwork Partners are one of two ‘traditional types’ 
within the reinsurance industry. They are structured as 
line underwriters, even where they 
write multiple classes of business. 
Their strategic proposition is to be 
lexible in assembling a portfolio 
of typically smaller lines and deals. 
This type privileges the following in 
selecting business: (i) evaluating 
each line on its own merits, rather 
than leveraging the multiple lines 
written across a particular cedent; 
(ii) continuity of relationships, but 
with a tendency to scale up or 
down their commitment according 
to deal proitability in any given year, for example 
by moving to remote layers and watching lines; 
(iii) moderate technicality in conjunction with other 
factors, such as knowing the market or cedent when 
deals fall below the technical price; (iv) lexibility in 
moving along different dimensions in the matrix. The 
Patchwork Partner has a medium-term proitability 
horizon, offsetting lower-returning deals with more 
favourable ones within their overall patchwork 
approach to assembling a business portfolio. This type 
has considerable lexibility to pursue opportunities, 
within a clearly deined strategy of when to privilege 
different dimensions of our matrix. However, there 
is also a tendency to become ‘stuck-in-the-middle’, 
if Patchwork Partners drift into writing expiring lines 
over a succession of soft market cycles. This segment 
is highly competitive, comprising many small and 
medium-sized reinsurers, as well as encroachment 
from other types when they attempt small-scale 
diversiication.  
Portfolio Partners have a strategic proposition of 
generating capital eficiency and stable long-term 
returns through diversiication. They thus take portfolio 
diversiication seriously by writing multi-territory (scale), 
multi-line (scope), and short and long tail business 
“Maximising your 
exposure to a risk 
when it’s well paid 
and minimising 
your exposure in 
its slightly less well 
paid periods. But 
all the time, you’re 
trying to hold that 
relationship and 
keep it strong.”  
(Reinsurer)
“We work very hard 
at trying to craft the 
deal as opposed to 
just being a 5% yes 
or no on some Cat 
deal. A lot of what 
we do is bespoke; 
it’s not open market. 
We try to build 
extraordinarily 
strong relationships 
with the clients.”  
(Reinsurer)
“We don’t write 
business we don’t 
think is profitable. 
We don’t look at 
it as a loss leader. 
We just say: ‘Look, 
this is what we do 
for a living. You can 
show us your XLs 
and we’ll write them 
or not. Here’s the 
price, here’s the 
capacity’; and it’s 
more or less ‘take 
it or leave it’.”  
(Reinsurer)
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(length). This type privileges the 
following in selecting business: (i) 
a ‘whole account’ approach to the 
business written with a cedent, 
either through whole account 
metrics, or by considering the 
whole relationship over individual 
deals; (ii) continuity in business 
relationships; (iii) strongly technical 
approaches to evaluating the 
account as a whole over multiple 
years, not just the most analysable 
or technically-priced lines and 
regions in any given year; (iv) leveraging across the 
cedent portfolio to gain preferential terms or access to 
better business. They aim to be more than a capacity 
provider, even where they may provide signiicant 
capital, and so encourage lock-in with cedents 
through the breadth of cover and services they can 
offer. Portfolio Partners typically write a wide variety 
of business at varying rates of return and varying 
volatility. Their challenge is to make commercial sense 
of such variety, which cannot easily be compared 
across a portfolio. Despite their technical strengths, 
capital eficiency through diversiication is, thus, 
often an article of faith. Much of the globally available 
premium is placed with these players, because of 
their involvement in most of the main programmes 
as well as their spread across most lines of business 
and their extension into most territories. They thus 
face competition from all of the other types, and lose 
market share whenever they waver on their proposition 
of continuity and reliability, for example scaling back a 
particular line of business or territory. 
The Blanket Partner is the other 
‘traditional type’ in the industry, 
growing out of writing local 
business during a less technical 
era. Blanket Partners also take 
portfolio diversiication seriously 
by writing multi-territory, multi-line, 
and short and long tail business. 
Their strategic proposition is 
to develop deep, long-term 
relationships with the best clients in 
any particular market, write across 
those clients’ portfolios and ride the fortunes of the 
market with them. This type privileges the following in 
selecting business: (i) whole account and ‘bouquet’ 
programmes, where they write an even share across 
all layers and lines of business; (ii) continuity in 
business relationships; (iii) underwriter knowledge of 
the cedent and market, rather than technical analysis, 
in order to have the ‘market pick’ of the best cedents 
with which to diversify. Blanket Partners are less 
focused on deal or client RoE in any given year, than 
on stable long-term proitability through diversiication 
across lines and markets. They are particularly well 
suited to local partnerships, less technical business, 
such as bouquets, and less analysable territories. 
However, much of their traditional local business is 
eroding due to consolidation. 
Last Resort is not a business 
model in itself. Rather, it is a 
strategic proposition to capture 
value on short-term, opportunistic 
business that has a high price 
due to shortage of capacity in a 
given year. Immediately following 
catastrophic events, much of 
the industry will pull back in the 
short-term to evaluate losses, creating a short-term 
need. Similarly, some cedents after a big loss may 
need additional, high-priced cover that does not it 
the strategic propositions of the other segments of 
the market. These gaps are opportunities for players 
with suficient capital to make rapid short-term 
moves. The emphasis is not on the analysability of the 
business (immediately post-catastrophe this might be 
impossible) but on exploiting rate rises through short-
term relationships based on a capacity shortfall. Some 
Deal-Making Partners are able to exploit this position, 
because of their signiicant capital, while other irms 
may have one underwriter or team with ring-fenced 
capital that can be deployed purely for such potential 
opportunities.   
3.1.2 Strategic Emphasis: Myths about Portfolio 
or Cycle Management
There are two strategic ‘pillars’ in reinsurance: Portfolio 
management and cycle management. A reinsurer’s 
strategic-type has implications for its primary strategic 
focus on either cycle management or portfolio 
management. While any reinsurer will incorporate 
elements of both strategies there will be an ultimate 
prioritization of one over the other. 
Those prioritizing long-term relationships across 
a cedent’s account, such as Blanket and Portfolio 
Partners, will prioritize portfolio management. These 
reinsurers take portfolio diversiication seriously, in 
terms of scope across all lines of business, breadth 
across multiple territories, and length in writing both 
short and long tail business. The aim is (i) eficient 
capital allocation; and (ii) to ride the cyclical fortunes of 
different markets and stabilize returns. While different 
deals have different levels of proitability, smaller deals 
with lower RoE justify the overheads of accessing and 
“The market 
knowledge and the 
client knowledge 
come first and the 
modelling is second; 
we do not have to 
understand each 
and every detail…
It’s also multi-year, 
it’s a partnership 
with the client 
without any end.”  
(Reinsurer)
“It’s short-term. 
It’ll be heavily 
over-priced, but 
there’s no continuity 
in it. You know if 
they hit us, they 
take the money.”  
(Reinsurer)
“The value 
proposition is 
reliability and the 
relationship. We 
were able to get 
preferential terms, 
due to the value the 
customer puts into 
the relationship; 
and our technical 
expertise, that we 
understand what 
they are doing.”  
(Reinsurer)
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writing them because all deals are needed to create 
the diversiied portfolio. However, there always remains 
a tension between target RoE and actual proitability in 
different parts of the portfolio. Furthermore, managers 
in such companies need to be aware that they may be 
making 65-75% of their income from a smaller book 
of key players, followed by a high volume of small 
players for the remaining 25-35%. We describe this as 
the ‘volume vs. value myth’, in which a large number 
of clients (volume) can obscure the reality that the 
majority of value is coming from a small number of 
players.
By contrast, reinsurers operating on a more 
transactional short-term basis, on largely mono-
line catastrophe business, will prioritize cycle 
management. As market cycles are globally connected 
there is an overall cycle management effect of 
expansion in harder markets and contraction in softer 
ones. However, each territory may also experience 
speciic, localised hardening or softening, which can 
be the source of local expansion and contraction. 
A reinsurer committed to cycle management needs 
clear metrics and underwriting processes that enable 
identiication of hardening and softening in different 
markets and the ability to withdraw or escalate rapidly. 
To be a true cycle manager, reinsurers will need strong 
parent or investor backing to scale back capacity in 
a soft cycle and accelerate in a hard cycle, which is 
dificult in a stand-alone, investor-exposed business. 
That is, in a soft cycle, cycle managers need to decide 
what to do with excess capacity that cannot achieve 
their targeted proitability. We label this the ‘withholding 
capital’ myth, as such capital could be returned to 
investors: But in reality this is hard to do and usually 
results in writing business at lower rates of return.
3.1.3 Growth trajectories of strategic types
Reinsurers can use the Strategic Positioning Tool 
to diagnose their type and evaluate the consistency 
of their strategic proposition. However, there is no 
‘best’ type, as each is based on different perceptions 
of proitability, has a different risk appetite, and 
competes on a different value proposition. Thus, as 
irms evolve they may re-evaluate their strategic type, 
which does not need to be static. Rather, reinsurers 
can also use the Strategic Positioning Tool to evaluate 
potential growth trajectories. We outline a few typical 
trajectories below: 
Price-Taking Profiteer: A Price-Taking Proiteer 
set up in a hard market will at some point encounter 
a soft market. Without a capital structure that allows 
aggressive cycle management, they often evolve into 
Patchwork Partners; for example, renewing expiring 
lines at a lower rate in order to maintain an existing 
relationship. This decision can either be strategic 
(‘we will accept a lower ROE on business that is less 
volatile’) or merely reactionary. A second viable option 
is to retain a focus on highly analysable catastrophe 
business and attempt to shift into being Deal-Making 
Partners with a few select clients that have larger 
capacity needs that suit their technical approach to 
business. This second option may be particularly 
attractive to those Price-Taking Proiteers who have 
reached a critical mass in terms of capacity.  
Deal-Making Partners: 
Deal-Making Partners may come 
under pressure from ratings 
agencies to diversify. One option 
is to evolve into other lines as a 
Patchwork Partner, maintaining 
a focus on catastrophe capacity 
based on its Deal-Making legacy, 
but offering additional lines of 
business on a selective basis. 
Alternatively, they could also evolve 
into a Portfolio Partner (develop their relationships into 
other lines and leverage their technical infrastructure 
to provide a full service. However, this strategic move 
towards a ‘whole account’ approach is often a step 
too far for Deal-Making Partners. Another option 
is to set-up a subsidiary, operating separately as a 
‘start-up’ in a different reinsurance segment. This is 
potentially a good way to ‘experiment’ with excess 
capacity in soft markets or respond to pressure for 
diversiication.
Contrasting views on strategic 
priorities
“We need to be mindful of the margin as well, but 
when you have an across-the-board approach at 
least you have a more robust portfolio. If you have 
a loss you have more diversity because you are 
working with a client who has diverse exposures.” 
(Portfolio Partner)
“The rating agencies drive us towards 
diversification. But some of the fields we move into 
may actually bring our loss ratios up. That’s when 
diversification becomes just ‘worsification’.”  
(Price-Taking Profiteer)
“This start-up has 
been established to 
write the business 
they don’t get 
at HQ. We are 
not a Cat writer; 
our parent has a 
portfolio like that, 
mainly Cat.”  
(Start-up subsidiary)
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Patchwork Partners: The 
lexibility of this segment 
means that many Patchwork 
Partners can maintain their 
position in the ‘centre’ within 
minor shifts along different 
dimensions to adjust for market 
cycles. However, this approach 
also has an optimum size. If a 
Patchwork Partner grows to the 
extent where it provides signiicant 
capacity and also writes multiple lines for a cedent, it 
will face pressure to become more of a whole account 
or relationship provider. Similarly, investors are likely to 
expect some bold strategy to increase returns on their 
investment, which may curtail the ability to ‘pick-and-
choose’ as Patchwork Partners attain critical mass. 
They may thus choose to grow towards the Portfolio 
Partner approach with select clients, or to build more 
signiicant catastrophe lines with other clients, in a bid 
to become Deal-Making Partners. 
Blanket Partners: As one of the original strategic 
types, many traditional Blanket Partners have evolved 
into Portfolio Partners with the growth of technology 
and modelling. We see this as the main trajectory for 
Blanket Partners to capitalise on their knowledge of 
clients and markets. 
Portfolio Partners: Portfolio Partners experience 
the greatest ‘lock-in’ of any strategic type. It is hard 
to step away from an ingrained approach to whole 
account relationships, as cedents are sensitive to any 
‘wavering’ on the part of their key account providers, 
while competitors hover, ready to move into any 
openings made by a breakdown in these relationships. 
Thus, the sunk costs in technical and market 
infrastructure, distribution channels, and relationships 
tend to establish a level of strategic inertia with existing 
business. Nonetheless, such players may be able 
to operate differently through different ofices (for 
example, some of their ofices in emerging markets 
may operate as Blanket Partners). Similarly, because 
of their depth of resources and infrastructure, such 
players are well positioned to experiment with new 
product development.   
3.1.4 From dance floor to musical chairs: The 
state of global competition
After several years of soft cycles and static global 
premium, the reinsurance industry is in a very 
competitive phase, with ample capacity rapidly 
absorbing the potential increases from quite major 
events. In such a market, reinsurers begin to question 
the viability of their business model. They search for 
alternatives, primarily by going after market share 
in mature markets, or exploring the potential for 
growth in new territories. Consolidation has been an 
“We have to step 
a little bit away 
from this pick and 
choose strategy. At 
a certain size you 
cannot afford to 
have this attitude 
anymore; this is a 
transition phase 
I think we are 
facing now.”  
(Patchwork partner)
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observable trajectory, where reinsurers use merger 
and acquisition to access additional revenue. Such 
acquisitions can either focus on critical mass through 
mergers between similar types, or accessing different 
types of business through the acquired irm’s distinct 
business model. 
Another, deining trajectory of 
the current environment is the 
‘start-up’ subsidiary as a way 
of exploring alternative types of 
business. Reinsurers set up ofices 
or separate companies to operate in 
an alternative way in other markets; 
for example, to explore whether 
Asia, particularly China, will yield 
gold, or to ind out whether money 
can be made from diversifying 
into alternative lines of business. 
In doing so, they must adopt the 
strategic positions and methods 
of selecting business of other 
segments. For example, Patchwork 
Partners, Proiteers and Deal-Making Partners have 
set up European start-ups to operate as small Portfolio 
Partners and access new business not available to the 
parent company. To do this they need the mandate 
to operate in a whole-account fashion, a business 
model radically distinct from that of their parent. 
Others attempt to penetrate Asia, where the lack of 
analysability in many markets is a source of confusion. 
Here, subsidiaries need to be conident operating 
as Blanket Partners, even where this counters the 
technical, short-term RoE focus of their parent. The 
result is confusion and shake out, as some reinsurers 
learn new skills, others refocus on the core business, 
and yet others get burnt and exit the industry. While 
the beauty of differentiated strategic types was that 
reinsurers could all dance their own steps without 
bumping into each other, the dance loor is now 
more crowded. Increasingly, reinsurance is a game of 
musical chairs, in which some parties will have to exit 
each time the music stops. 
3.1.5 Consistency or strategic chameleon: 
Conscious strategic positioning
This section outlined ive strategic types that have 
different strategic propositions, different appetites 
for business, and different perceptions of proitability, 
as summarised in the Reinsurer Strategic Orientation 
Chart (Figure 3.2). We end with a word of caution: 
Reinsurers need to be clear about their strategic 
position. Despite potential growth trajectories, 
consistency remains important. For example, a 
Portfolio Partner acting in ways contrary to the 
expectations associated with its type may meet with 
both internal resistance and external concern from 
cedents. The Reinsurer Strategic Positioning Tool 
enables reinsurers to assess their consistency with 
a particular strategic type. While deviations can be 
made for strategic reasons, these require the irm to 
be a strategic chameleon, able to shift types through 
clear switching rules. For example, a switching rule 
might be to act as a different type in a particular region 
or with particular clients. Such strategic clarity makes 
all the difference in being a strategic chameleon rather 
than being strategically confused and sending mixed 
messages internally and to the market. 
3.2 Structure and process: Implications for each 
strategic type
In order to be consistent with their strategic type, 
reinsurers need to align their strategies to their irm 
structures and underwriting processes. This section 
exposes tensions and trade-offs as reinsurers 
incorporate varying degrees of complexity into their 
structures and processes as they grow and expand 
internationally. In particular, it identiies potential 
line- or market-based multinational structures and 
their suitability for different strategic types. It also 
addresses the rise of a new role and function within 
the reinsurance irm, the account executive, and 
discusses how this role may best be incorporated 
into the decision-making structures of the irm. Finally, 
it examines how structures shape underwriting 
processes, and which processes are most eficient 
and effective for each strategic type.
Key implications of strategic 
types
•	 There is no one best way 
•	 It is important for reinsurers to be consistent 
with their strategic type, in order to avoid 
sending mixed messages about their strategic 
appetite
•	  Moving between strategic types may be part of 
a growth trajectory as reinsurers seek new 
business opportunities
•	 Shifting between types should be accompanied 
by clear switching rules based on a strategic 
proposition of accessing different types of 
business 
“But you can’t mix 
the two business 
models. It doesn’t 
work! You destroy 
either model if you 
try to mix them. 
It can’t be one 
unit: It has to be 
two units, but it 
works extremely 
well if you look 
at diversification, 
capital efficiency, 
things like that. So 
it works extremely 
well in the one 
company, but not 
as one unit.”  
(Reinsurer)
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3.2.1 Aligning structure and strategy
As reinsurance irms grow and expand globally, 
they face a number of structural tensions or ‘pulls’ 
towards different business requirements. Figure 3.3 
is a diagram of the different structural roles that make 
up a reinsurance irm. At the top of the organization 
structure is the strategic apex: The senior executive. 
The operating core that provides the core service 
of the organization, underwriters in the reinsurance 
context, is at the bottom. Middle managers are 
represented in the centre and include managerial 
staff such as account executives and business unit 
managers. These main functions are supplemented by 
technical staff, such as actuaries and modellers, who 
support the operating core by providing underwriters 
with technical input, and support staff, such as human 
resources and claims, on the right hand side. These 
distinct roles and responsibilities each exert a pressure 
or ‘pull’ on the structure towards their function and 
away from others. 
Traditionally the main ‘pull’ within the reinsurance irm 
has been that of the underwriter as the empowered 
‘point-of-sale’ decision maker for the company. 
In many irms this remains a deining structural 
feature. However, consolidation and globalisation are 
changing the nature of reinsurance judgement and 
the empowerment of underwriters. As the technical 
element of underwriting grows, so there is a stronger 
technical function and, with it, the tendency to 
standardize judgement around common pricing and 
analytic tools and techniques. This shapes underwriter 
 3) Adapted from Mintzberg, H. (1979). ‘The structuring of organizations: A synthesis of the   
 research.’ Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Key points: Structure and process
•	 As reinsurers grow and expand globally they 
face structural tensions that shift attention from 
underwriting judgement to other aspects of 
business development
•	 Line-based multinational structures align better 
with Patchwork Partners, Deal-Making Partners 
and Price-Taking Profiteers, while market-
based structures are more suitable for Blanket 
and Portfolio Partners
•	 The underwriting process combines four key 
areas of expertise: Technical; line or market; 
client; and portfolio. Different strategic types 
integrate these pools of expertise with varying 
degrees of complexity, according to their risk 
appetites and business preferences
•	 The greater the complexity of structure and 
process, the higher the costs of pursuing 
opportunities. Reinsurers need to align their 
structure and process with the strategic type to 
minimise unnecessary complexity
Pull to centralise
Empower Middle Mgt
Disempower UW
Empowered Line or
Market  UW
Standardisation 
empowers technical staff
Corporate Executive
Technical Staff
Technical input to core
work e.g. modellers, 
actuaries, R&D
Middle Management
Line authority over core 
work e.g. BU manager, 
CUO, Account Exec
Operating Core:
Underwriters who provide the core service. Professional staff 
with delegated decision authority are typically controlled by standardisation of skills 
and performance accountability
Support Staff
Support functions to core 
work e.g. claims, HR, etc
Figure 3.3 Structural Tensions for Reinsurers³
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3. Strategic types: Bases of competition for reinsurers (cont.)
judgement by providing increasingly tight parameters 
within which decisions are made. 
As reinsurers become larger and 
more multi-divisional there is also a 
pull to ‘balkanize.’ As organizations 
grow, managers of business units 
create separate kingdoms, which 
consolidate decision-making 
authority within higher middle 
management levels. At the same 
time, the account executive role has 
arisen at the middle management 
level, often in response to the rise of 
global cedents that necessitate this 
coordinating role within reinsurers. 
As middle management layers grow 
and corporate executives become 
more remote from the operating 
core, there is also a pull up the organization hierarchy 
towards centralised decision-making. The combined 
result is increased internal tensions that pulls attention 
away from the operating core of underwriters and 
disempowers them by reducing autonomy over 
point-of-sale decision-making. The incorporation of 
additional structural complexity, in terms of decision-
making and authority, should therefore be assessed 
critically. It brings with it additional tensions as well as 
reducing underwriter empowerment. The rate of return 
from growth needs to be considered against the costs 
and tensions of increased structural complexity.
Line or Market Structure: As irms expand globally, 
they also need to consider the form of multinational 
structure. The choice of multinational structure, 
which is depicted in Figure 3.4, relects different 
ways of differentiating expertise within a reinsurance 
irm, each of which has different coordination 
problems. Reinsurers need to consider two issues 
according to their stage of internationalisation: i) in 
the early stages of international expansion, whether 
to grow as an international company or simply to 
establish some international subsidiaries, as per the 
international subsidiary structure; ii) as they establish 
a global footprint, should they privilege line or market 
knowledge which would lead to, respectively, product 
(line) or area (market) division structures. Reinsurers 
can also be structured as a global matrix. However, 
such structures are often hard to manage and overly 
complex. They are, for this reason, less common. 
It is the ‘line versus market’ question that remains 
the central structural dilemma for reinsurers. As all 
structures have tensions, we now consider the implicit 
trade-offs in these two different approaches.
“Our ethos means 
that we did not 
want pricing 
tools to inhibit 
the underwriting 
decision. So these 
models are more 
here to help the 
underwriter than 
they are to tie him 
down to a particular 
answer. There is 
then a lot of freedom 
and judgment 
allowed as to how 
these things are 
then used.”  
(Reinsurer)
 (4) Adapted from Birkinshaw, J. (2001). ‘The Structure behind Global Companies’.In Pickford, J.   
 (Ed.) FT: Mastering Management 2.0, London: Financial Times/Prentice Hall: 75-80.
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3. Strategic types: Bases of competition for reinsurers (cont.)
A typical line underwriting divisional structure, that may 
then be further segmented by territory, has 
advantages because it:
1. Enables irms to concentrate line expertise around 
reinsurance products.
2. Is well adapted to cycle management; allowing 
line underwriters to adapt their deals to the market 
cycles of their territories.
3. Facilitates performance measurement at the irm 
level as, data can be collated and compared by line 
to control risk accumulation and to compare returns 
on territories.
4. Simple and well adapted to the way that risks are 
traditionally structured by line and territory. 
Given these strengths, Patchwork Partner, Deal-
Making Partner and Price-Taking Proiteers are best 
served by a line structure. 
A market-based structure also has advantages: 
1. A market-based structure is more aligned with a 
client centric approach and writing whole account 
and bouquet programmes. 
2.  Generally, it enables reinsurers to get closer to 
their clients and to gain deep knowledge of both 
their clients and particular regional and cultural 
speciicities. 
3.  Catastrophe capacity is not separated from other 
lines, which can be helpful for leveraging the value 
of this capacity strategically with clients and across 
the portfolio.
4.  A market-based structure is better aligned with a 
portfolio management strategic emphasis.
These advantages are more important for 
‘relationship-based’ and whole account players, such 
as Portfolio and Blanket Partners, because lines of 
business are not written in isolation. 
Account Executive Role: A third structural issue 
in multinational reinsurance irms is the rise of 
the account executive. An increasing number of 
reinsurers, particularly those who prioritize whole 
account and long-term relationships, are incorporating 
account executives into their structures. This new 
role within the reinsurance organizational structure 
is largely a response to the consolidation of cedents; 
appointing a speciic person to support these larger 
cedents’ needs. The structural demands and decision 
authority of the account executive varies according 
to whether it is: i) a sales role, to help with on-selling 
reinsurance capital across a cedent’s whole book of 
risks; ii) a coordinating role, to interpret and explain 
the wider implications of the cedent to line and market 
underwriters looking at particular programmes; or 
iii) a decision-making role, to bring each individual 
underwriter’s judgement of a particular programme 
together in a decision on the cedent as a whole. Each 
of these roles gives more authority to the account 
executive to inluence line and market decisions, such 
as whether more risk should be taken in one territory 
or line as part of an appetite for risks in another 
territory or line. It is, thus, a structurally important 
role in terms of where it is positioned within the irm 
hierarchy and how its duties may be carried out 
across different line and market structures. In market-
based structures, an account executive can perhaps 
coordinate across different markets in response to 
increasingly regional and global programmes that 
transcend the traditional territory boundaries. In line-
based structures, they can coordinate a view of the 
client across their different programmes an provide 
a holistic picture of the client in an otherwise deal-
based assessment. A key determinant of structural 
position in the hierarchy, for example, as a business 
unit manager with line authority, is whether the account 
executive has the power to inluence underwriting 
decisions and allocation of capital to key clients. If so, 
it is a meaningful structural addition that warrants the 
additional structural complexity that it entails.
3.2.2 Accessing expertise: Line or account-based 
underwriting processes
Structural considerations are important because they 
shape the underwriting processes, which are the 
basis for making decisions about capital allocation in 
the reinsurance irm. There are four areas of expertise 
required in the underwriting process: Technical 
knowledge, contextual knowledge of the line and/or 
market, client knowledge and knowledge of the irm 
portfolio and risk appetite. The way that these areas 
of expertise are combined has different implications 
for each strategic type. This section discusses the 
implications of a line- or an account-based approach 
to combining these areas of 
expertise within the underwriting 
process. 
Figure 3.5 overleaf displays the 
line-based underwriting process. 
The black line indicates the main 
areas of expertise, technical 
and contextual, that are used 
actively in traditional underwriter 
judgement. This process involves 
“We are very 
transactional. The 
deal comes to us 
and we look at it in 
the [LoB] silo, and 
it is pure numbers. 
If the numbers 
work it is ‘yes’; if 
the numbers do 
not work, ‘no’.”  
(Reinsurer)
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a deal coming directly to the relevant line underwriter, 
who works with the analyst as needed, then makes 
a decision that is signed off by a line-underwriter 
colleague. It is a simple and eficient process. For 
more complex line-based deals, there may be a longer 
period of decision-making with more iteration between 
underwriter and analyst. This process puts line-based 
underwriting judgement at the core of the irm and 
favours empowered underwriting. It is well suited to a 
cycle management strategy where each deal is judged 
on a stand-alone basis for its proitability. For example, 
an underwriter can use the technical input to easily 
compare the RoE and technical ratios of one deal with 
another. Portfolio concerns about risk appetite and 
accumulation can then be factored in through analysis 
of exposure as part of the underwriting process, or 
perhaps as part of a referral process for large deals. 
Many reinsurers can focus solely 
on this ‘core’ of the underwriting 
process. For instance, Price-Taking 
Proiteers require, for most deals, a 
simple iteration between contextual 
and analytical areas of expertise. 
As their emphasis is analytical, the 
deal may even be sent straight to 
the analyst before being assessed 
by the underwriter. Patchwork Partners similarly tend 
to have an eficient underwriting process, led by line 
underwriter judgement combined with selective use of 
technical input. Deal-Making Partners are analytically 
focused in a similar fashion to Proiteers, yet, due to 
the size of the capacity placed, their process generally 
entails more iteration between underwriters and 
analysts. For this reason they might also call on the 
corporate-level decision makers to a greater degree. 
A process oriented around line and analytical expertise 
is insuficient as irms move towards a whole account 
approach or want to prioritize the incorporation 
of market knowledge. For Blanket Partners it is 
necessary to incorporate market and client expertise, 
whilst the technical knowledge domain is less of 
a priority. Portfolio Partners need to formalize the 
incorporation of all areas of expertise including cross-
LoB exchange of knowledge, due to their commitment 
to whole account approaches, their emphasis on 
analytics, and their varied portfolio of both small local 
cedents and large capacity global programmes. Thus, 
service differentiation provided by Portfolio Partners 
comes at a greater cost and with greater complexity. 
The market-or account-led process depicted in 
Figure 3.6 provides an alternative, if the traditional 
line-underwriter driven process does not align with a 
reinsurer’s strategic goals. A market-or account-led 
process privileges a portfolio management strategy, 
enabling a more holistic view of a cedent’s portfolio 
“Things are looked 
at as a whole ball 
of wax. You can get 
things done, which 
in isolation nobody 
in their right mind 
would ever do.”  
(Reinsurer)
Corporate
Account
UW
Analysts
Referral: Level 2
Referral: Level 1
Market
Expert
Line
Expert
Line
Expert
Risk Appetite 
and Portfolio
Client
Contextual
Technical
Time
UW process
Time & Iterations: Size , co-location & complexity
Cross-BU/Account process
Referral process
Informal process
End of process
Triage point (formalised or un-formalised)
No
No
Figure 3.5 Underwriting Process: Line of Business Led
of risks and incorporating this into the reinsurer’s 
portfolio. This happens both at the underwriter level 
when considering the RoE on any particular piece 
of business, and also at the account level when 
considering the proitability of a client. Blanket Partners 
and Portfolio Partners often adopted such a process, 
either from their inception or as they realise the need 
to formalize the incorporation of market and client 
knowledge within their underwriting decisions. As 
illustrated by the black line in Figure 3.6, a market 
underwriter who is a de-facto client manager on local 
market deals - which is typical for Blanket Partners - 
can drive this process. Alternatively, as shown by the 
grey line,the process may be driven by an account 
executive who draws together the various line and 
market underwriting judgements, on any particular 
client, which is the typical approach for a Portfolio 
Partner. Formalizing the account executive role in the 
underwriting process may be helpful for all irms when 
dealing with large clients, as there is an increase in 
global and regional programmes that transcend the 
expertise of a single underwriter. 
3.2.3 Avoid unnecessary complexity
Reinsurers should be mindful of adding unnecessary 
complexity to their process. For example, too often 
reinsurers add blanket referral processes that 
use scarce senior executive attention when some 
risk appetite and portfolio knowledge could be 
incorporated into exposure management tools or 
delegated to lower management levels. Reinsurers 
should seek the simplest process possible, 
whilst maintaining triage points for appropriate 
exceptions, such as deals of a particular size or 
territorial complexity. An underwriting process that 
is consistent with the structure and strategic type will 
enable simplicity. For example, a Blanket Partner can 
simplify its process by ensuring it has a market-based 
structure and is market-underwriter led rather than 
having different line-underwriters involved in multiple 
iterations as they seek to coordinate a client’s various 
programmes. Similarly, a Price-Taking Proiteer gains 
no value from adding additional complexity around 
client or market knowledge in the underwriting 
process. 
We end this section with a note of caution. While 
there is no right way to do things, aligning strategy 
with structure and process reinforces consistency 
and reduces unnecessary complexity. It is important 
to recognise that seeking new opportunities comes 
at the cost of greater complexity. We question both 
the rate of return and the implications for underwriter 
judgement for much of those additional costs and 
increased complexity. Despite being an industry 
founded on underwriter judgement and empowered 
point-of-sale decision-making, many organizations 
have struggled to hold on to that simplicity as they 
respond to changes in their environment, such as the 
growth of ‘super-cedents’. Many reinsurers appear to 
be adding unnecessary complexity through attempting 
to be things that they are not. Further, even when 
complex structures and processes are necessary for 
growth, cost-reducing triage points can maintain a 
simpliied core for much of the business. 
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3.3 Conclusion: Implications of change for 
reinsurers
This section has illustrated variation in reinsurers’ 
strategy, structure and processes. We now place 
these analyses within the context of the changing 
reinsurance landscape in order to emphasize the 
implications of change and the need for reinsurers to 
adapt.
First, the bundled multi-territory products being 
purchased by Global Buyers are not well suited to 
the majority of reinsurers, because of the way that 
 
they allocate capital and manage exposures through 
territorial diversiication. For example, most reinsurers 
manage risk exposures by allocating capacity limits to 
particular territories, perils and lines. Thus, when they 
receive a bundled product, individual underwriters are 
not well positioned to evaluate the risk in relation to 
their portfolio or the irm’s risk appetite. New ways of 
evaluating such programmes will be necessary which 
may mean moving from individual to team underwriting 
and top-slicing capacity to re-allocate it from local to 
regional programmes, with commensurate changes in 
ways of managing risk exposure. 
Second, large homogenous covers that require high 
levels of capacity increase the comparability and 
potential attractiveness of alternative collateralised 
products as a supplement for traditional reinsurance 
products. Reinsurers may, thus, need to become more 
skilled in understanding these products, which may 
either be competitive products for reinsurance or may 
offer reinsurers alternative ways of selling their capital.
Third, as Local Buyers are eroding, the amount of 
premium available in that space is reducing, which 
increases competition amongst reinsurers. Reinsurers 
will, therefore, need to adapt their skills and resources 
to better service regional and global programmes. 
Fourth, emerging markets become key targets 
to diversify away from the dependence on global 
players. However, they are still largely unknown and 
un-analysable for many reinsurers and fail to supply 
suficient premium to offset other changes in the global 
market.
Taken together, these trends indicate that critical 
mass in reinsurers will be necessary for signiicant 
partnering with globally consolidated cedents. 
Currently, there is still enough variation in reinsurance 
buying to provide opportunities for a range of 
different types of reinsurance sellers. However, the 
market is increasingly competitive and adaptation 
will be necessary to meet the changes arising from 
consolidation and global convergence.
Key points: Structure and process
•	 Avoid unnecessary complexity: Assess both the 
rate of return on any additional complexity and 
also its potential to shift attention from 
underwriting judgement
•	 Ensure consistency with strategic type in order 
to avoid structures and processes that ‘battle’ 
with strategic priorities
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4. Fit for purpose? Matching cedents and reinsurers
This section brings the previously identiied reinsurer 
and cedent types together around the topic of it. 
It outlines the natural sources of ‘it’ within different 
cedent-reinsurer relationships. It then links this 
assessment to broader industry dynamics in order 
to identify where it is declining, so indicating some 
eroding sectors of the reinsurance market. 
4.1 Strategic Partnering: Diagnosing fit between 
reinsurers and cedents
Knowing who their natural partners are can help 
reinsurers and cedents to make best use of the 
resources that go into targeting and developing their 
business relationships. In this section, we develop 
a Strategic Partner Matrix for evaluating ‘it’ between 
the strategic positions and business orientations of 
different reinsurer and cedent types. The general 
parameters for assessing it, generated from the 
preceding analyses of reinsurers and cedents, 
are outlined below. In Figure 4.1, we illustrate the 
closeness of it through a 1-5 star rating with 1-star 
indicating strong differences in strategic position that 
are dificult to bridge and 5-stars indicating a close 
congruence in strategic orientation. We consider 
5-star partnerships a ‘natural it’, meaning that 
cedents should look for their reinsurance counterparts 
in this category as leaders on their slip and long-term 
partners and, conversely, reinsurers should focus on 
these types of cedents as their key targets.
Change to Key points: Strategic fit
•	 Different reinsurer and cedent types have 
varying degrees of fit, according to the 
reinsurer’s risk appetite and strategic 
capabilities and the cedent’s needs for capital 
and other skills and services
•	 Reinsurers need to target those cedents where 
they have the best fit 
•	 Some areas of natural fit for most reinsurers, 
such as Local Buyers, are an eroding sector of 
the industry in terms of the premium that they 
cede 
Change to Key points: Strategic fit
Basis for reinsurer assessment is: 
•	 Strategic emphasis on portfolio or cycle 
management
•	 Strategic appetite, based on preferences for 
relationship longevity, multi-line business, and 
technical analysability
•	 Line or market structure and ability to 
coordinate across both
•	 Capabilities in applying the four areas of 
expertise within the underwriting process
Basis for cedent assessment is: 
•	  Purpose, products and coordination of 
reinsurance buying
•	 Expectations of reinsurers, including cedent 
requirements for reinsurers with technical, line, 
and market expertise
•	 Cedents’ needs for significant lines of capital 
and for relationship length, depth and breadth
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4. Fit for purpose? Matching cedents and reinsurers (cont.)
The Strategic Partner Matrix 
demonstrates that an organization 
cannot be all things to all people. 
Even if different reinsurer strategic 
types can write particular cedent 
types, this does not necessarily 
mean that there is good it or that 
these relationships are making the 
best use of their resources. Thus, 
we advocate a targeted approach: 
A reinsurer should build the core of 
its portfolio around those cedent 
types that are central to its strategic 
appetite and provide good it with 
its structures and processes. To create a balanced 
portfolio, a reinsurer then engages in a more peripheral 
way with other cedent types. For example, a smaller 
reinsurer with less technical infrastructure would ind it 
hard to be a meaningful partner to Global Buyers, and 
would not be seen as a core partner by them. We thus 
highlight the following points:
1. The Portfolio Partner has some it with all 
categories, albeit less with the Local and Emerging 
Market Buyer. While the Portfolio Partner has the 
capital and competence, in terms of technical and 
client management infrastructure, to write these 
cedents, their needs do not fully exploit the Portfolio 
Partner’s assets. Hence, these cedents come at a 
relatively high cost per deal, which is sustainable 
only because of the sunk costs in a portfolio 
strategy and the Portfolio Partner’s belief in their 
diversifying beneit.
2. All reinsurers can write Local and Regional Buyers 
at some level of it, because these are the traditional 
buyer types that align with traditional, empowered 
underwriters with line or market expertise. 
3. The Price-Taking Proiteer it is determined very 
strongly by the market cycle.  As strong cycle 
managers, they look for analysable, high-RoE 
deals, which predisposes them to USA business, 
followed by some other select territories. 
Consequently, their it with Regional and Local 
Buyers is geographically predisposed towards the 
USA and a few other information-rich territories.
Based on our prior analyses of the way that centralised 
reinsurance buying is shaping the global landscape, 
we also provide the following caveats: 
1.  While one of the traditional reinsurers - the 
Patchwork Partner - and the traditional Local Buyer 
have good it, this space is eroding because of 
consolidation. 
“If we talk about 
the 10 biggest 
insurers; if you look 
at their programmes 
it’s going to be 
a worldwide Cat 
XL: $2 billion of 
capacity. What can 
we do? How can we 
be with them? We 
just haven’t got the 
modelling and also 
capital and capacity 
to be a meaningful 
partner to them.”  
(Reinsurer)
Global
Portfolio
Partner
Price-taking 
Profiteer
Deal-making 
Partner
Patchwork 
Partner
Blanket
Partner
Natural fit based on: 
technical capabilities; 
account executives; 
capacity; and relationship
focus (if large)
Less fit: have line-focused 
technical capabilities but 
reinsurer appetite 
misaligned  to cedent 
bundled capacity needs; 
Follower by RoE
Minimal fit: UW expertise 
market based and 
insuficient technical 
structure
Reasonable fit: Tech 
expertise to deal with 
large homogenous 
programs. Capacity for high 
RoE or private deals
Less fit: LoB approach 
localized; technical 
capabilities stretched; lack 
of coordinating account 
focus
Less fit: as market driven 
approach only viable for 
highly-consistent regions; 
technical ability stretched 
on aggregates
 Minimal fit
Expertise market not 
LoB based
Regional
Relationship focus, account 
executive and team UW 
result in good fit
Technically driven and line 
focused UWing is good fit 
with US regionals (who 
also match RoE 
expectations) 
Natural fit with techical 
expertise, capacity and
relationship focus. 
Best it: High information and 
RoE regions
Reasonable fit: but 
localized LoB approach & 
analytical capabilities (for 
US regionals) stretched
Market–centric expertise 
& relationship focus result 
in good fit. Smaller 
technical capability 
suficient for some Locals
Local
Reasonable fit: relationship 
and portfolio focus. Excess 
resources for buyers' needs
Technically driven approach 
and infrastructure means
less fit; opportunism 
detracts. Best it high 
analysis/RoE Locals
Reasonable fit depending 
on region (analysability and
proit). Best it: high 
analysis/ RoE Locals
Natural fit: with local LoB, 
empowered underwriter 
approach and moderate 
technical ability and demand
Good fit with market centric 
and less analytical 
approach. Relationship 
focus less exploited
Emerging
Less fit: technical and  
account capabilities 
unexploited; relationship 
focus not adding value. 
Write for portfolio 
Mimimal fit
(As above)
Minimal fit on either side. 
Not analysable and 
boutiques the norm
LoB focus (no bouquets 
and less market knowledge) 
means Less fit
Good fit: as part of portfolio 
mgt. and relationship focus. 
Relationship focus adds 
value
Mimimal fit
(As above)
Minimal fit on either side 
as line and technical 
expertise is CAT based
Good fit: LoB and 
relationship focus. However, 
not  always full range of SL; 
unlike Portfolio Partner
Specialty
Figure 4.1 Strategic Partner Matrix
(A relationship with 3 stars is viable with some stretch on either side to create fit, while 1 star is not viable and 5 stars is natural fit. NB. The ‘Last Resort’ identified in the 
Reinsurer Strategic Positioning Tool, Figure 3.1, is not included here as it is a strategic ploy, not a true strategic type)
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2. As this space cedes less overall premium to the 
market, it is becoming more competitive. Those 
reinsurers who are primarily adapted to the Local 
Buyer market will struggle to ind a suficient 
number of proitable or sizable deals to it their 
analytic capability and risk appetite.
4.2 Conclusion: Responding to challenges for fit
A central theme of this report is that consolidation is 
changing buyer and seller behaviour. While Local and 
Regional Buyers are attractive, with high degrees of 
it to most reinsurers, this space is shrinking. As Local 
Buyers are consolidated into Regional and Global 
Buyers, reinsurers primarily adapted to have natural 
it with these players will struggle to ind suficient 
proitable or sizable deals to write. The on-going trend 
in this regard should be a concern for many reinsurers, 
as much of the industry has developed to have 
natural it with exactly these traditional Local Buyers. 
Consequently, many reinsurers will need to establish 
their strategic response to consolidation and adapt 
their strategy, structure, and process accordingly. 
One response is that reinsurers can become ‘strategic 
chameleons’ in their client management and develop 
triage points in their underwriting processes that 
enable them to treat different types of clients differently. 
This can be achieved through clear switching rules. 
We argue that this should be done as a way to grow 
a portfolio of business not in a way that undermines 
a reinsurer’s strategic identify, or indeed relationships 
with its core group of cedents where natural it 
exists. For example, a Portfolio Partner reverting to 
a Blanket Partner with emerging market clients does 
not change the fact that its primary focus remains 
Global Buyers that beneit from and appreciate the full 
service and infrastructure a Portfolio Partner provides. 
By contrast, a Patchwork Partner might develop a 
separate ‘Global Account’ unit to run alongside (rather 
than supplement) its traditional line and deal focused 
structure and processes, in order to increase its it with 
Global and large Regional Buyers. 
Finally, many things can moderate the degree of it 
between reinsurer and cedent, including stage of 
market cycle, size of capacity offered, and broker 
supplementation of skills and expertise. This last point 
is the focus of the next section as we turn to the role of 
brokers. 
Summary: Strategic fit
•	 Reinsurers should target those cedents where 
they have natural fit
•	 Reinsurers whose natural fit is misaligned with 
the shift in global premium away from Local 
Buyers towards Regional and Global Buyers 
need to address this as a strategic priority
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5. Intelligent matchmaking: Adding value through brokers
While brokers have always been an integral part of 
reinsurance trading in the Lloyd’s of London market, 
in Continental Europe, direct relationships between 
cedents and reinsurers have often been the norm. Yet, 
at a time when most sectors move towards increasing 
dis-intermediation, there has been an increase in 
brokered reinsurance placements, even in mature 
markets. The ability of brokers to penetrate a market 
in which the reinsurance premium ceded is relatively 
static, indicates that they are able to add value within 
the changing global landscape. This is partially due 
to the rapid consolidation of the broking market 
into three main irms that have the critical mass and 
global reach to offer services globally to their global 
clients, as well as to exploit opportunities for growth 
in emerging markets. In this section, we explain how 
brokers add value to both cedents and reinsurers. 
The role of brokers is then introduced to show where 
they may add value by increasing it between cedents 
and reinsurers, as well as where broking opportunities 
are eroding. Finally, we consider how brokers may 
also extract value for the services they provide. 
5.1 Brokers’ added value
In this section we disentangle where and how brokers 
add value to both cedents and reinsurers and then 
unpack the different service expectations that cedents 
have of brokers. We conclude by suggesting that 
alternative forms of remuneration are critical in order 
for brokers to better create value for, and extract value 
from, their role in the reinsurance industry.
5.1.1 Brokering value triangle
As the main relationship for 
exchange of products and 
services is between cedents and 
reinsurers, inclusion of an additional 
intermediary in the reinsurance 
value chain suggests that brokers 
are perceived to add value 
beyond the costs they create. As 
illustrated in the Brokering Value 
Triangle (Figure 5.1), cedents and 
reinsurers jointly create value in 
the form of reinsurance cover for 
the cedent and premium income 
for the reinsurer. The extent of 
value in this direct relationship (Vd) revolves around 
particular challenges that both cedents and reinsurers 
want to minimize. Brokers have entered the market 
with services that can mitigate these challenges on 
both sides. To succeed, they have to create greater 
net value within the value chain (Vi), than could be 
achieved through a direct relationship (Vi>Vd). In 
return, they are remunerated through brokerage 
upon the successful placement of a reinsurance 
programme. As brokerage is paid by the cedent, 
but reclaimed from the reinsurer, it is important that 
– even though the cedent is the broker’s client – the 
reinsurer gets good value from the broker as well. 
Serving a client to the detriment of their counter-
part, the reinsurer, is a poor business practice that 
eventually will come to harm the cedent as well. The 
value brokers can provide centres around challenges 
reinsurer and cedents face in the area of distribution, 
information quality, and pricing, as well as additional 
services generated through their infrastructure and 
technical knowledge. 
Distribution is a challenge that traditionally has 
necessitated the role of brokers in the reinsurance 
market. Cedents may struggle to access suficient 
quality capacity for their programmes because: i) they 
are large and capacity is limited; ii) they do not have 
a good understanding of reinsurers’ speciic risk 
appetites in order to target them directly; or iii) placing 
Key points in this section
•	 While brokers are advocates for cedents, they 
are also an intermediary in the cedent-reinsurer 
value chain and must, thus, consider the value 
that they provide to reinsurers
•	 To expand their role in the market, brokers need 
to generate clearer value propositions that 
differentiate between the services needed by 
different cedent types and match these with 
different reinsurer types
•	 Brokers must focus their traditional distribution 
channel and placement services on those 
cedent-reinsurer relationships that could not be 
conducted without intermediation. This is 
heartland business in which brokers can clearly 
both add and also extract value
•	 For other relationships, brokers’ ability to add 
and extract value depends on the specific 
competences they are able to bring to a 
changing landscape for brokering opportunities
•	 Some services are not easily remunerated 
through traditional means such as brokerage. 
Broadening the horizon on alternative forms of 
remuneration, such as fee-for-service, is critical 
for the future of broking
“If the broker is 
adding value to the 
companies, and 
very often they do 
offer additional 
value, it has a price. 
The broker has to be 
paid, so it will come 
out of the price that 
the client has to pay 
us.  If that doesn’t 
add anything to 
the client, we’ll 
say ‘Well you can 
do it direct’.”  
(Reinsurer)
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a programme across a large number of reinsurers 
requires an infeasible or expensive amount of leg work 
to be done by the cedent. 
Reinsurers also confront distribution 
challenges in terms of accessing 
suficient good quality business 
to fulil their portfolio goals. They 
can struggle to access suficient 
breadth of business to diversify the 
risk in their portfolio. Diversiication 
into sub-par programmes can 
quickly lead to ‘worsiication’ 
in terms of portfolio proitability. 
Reinsurers may also struggle 
to access suficient depth of 
business, failing to allocate their 
full capacity in a market or line of 
business. Particularly when they are 
newcomers in a territory or line of 
business, reinsurers can struggle to 
generate interest in their capacity, as many ‘start-up’ 
subsidiaries experience. In such situations, reinsurers 
can use brokers as a distribution channel to market 
their capacity. 
As distribution challenges are lipsides of the same 
problem, brokers can use their market intelligence 
to connect cedents requiring extra capacity with 
reinsurers looking to make their capital work harder. 
This is at the heart of the brokers’ role in the global 
reinsurance marketplace; using their networks to 
do the legwork of identifying promising matches 
between cedents and reinsurers. Internationalisation 
and diversiication of reinsurer portfolios present 
distinct opportunities for brokers, helping reinsurers 
to establish their global presence by identifying 
cedents where they may be able to gain an initial 
share of the business. Where reinsurers struggle to 
access business due to the absence of an ofice in a 
targeted region, brokers can be their ‘eyes and ears 
on the ground.’ To do so, however, requires a globally 
coordinated and joined up approach from producing 
brokers accessing cedents in various regions to 
placing brokers that understand the reinsurer’s 
appetite. Importantly, this move allows brokers to 
create a win-win situation from which both cedent and 
reinsurer beneit. 
Information quality is another 
substantial challenge for both 
cedents and reinsurers; and an area 
where brokers sometimes have 
misinterpreted their matchmaking 
role in the past. For reinsurers, poor 
information means assuming risks 
that they do not fully understand. 
The Thai loods were a striking 
example, taking reinsurers by 
surprise with losses that they had 
not realised were in their portfolio. 
Brokers have a critical role to 
play making sure that reinsurers 
are spared from such surprises. 
Improving the information their clients provide and the 
ways in which they present it, can reduce perceived 
“Many people had 
never heard about 
us, so as new 
capacity we need 
somebody who’s 
doing advertisement 
for us: The brokers. 
The brokers are 
going around 
saying; ‘There’s new 
capacity, by the way 
very good security’. 
This helped 
because when I 
went to companies, 
they already knew 
because the brokers 
had told them. It 
was very important.” 
(Reinsurer)
“We appreciate the 
fact the brokers 
pre-crunch the 
information and 
present it in a more 
usable way. What 
we get is normally 
a much better 
presentation if they 
come from a large 
reputed broker 
than what we 
would have from 
a small client with 
very little internal 
resources for that.”  
(Reinsurer)
Challenges for Reinsurers 
a) Cannot access suficient spread in 
 portfolio
b)  Surprises in portfolio because of 
 insuficient information
c)  Accessing cedents directly incurs 
 excessive costs 
Challenges for Cedents
a) Cannot access suficient reinsurers 
 to cover risk
b)  Reinsurer makes cedent pay too 
 much
c)  Reinsurer does not pay claims
Value Added Through:
Volume and quality of distribution channel
Transform information into usable format
Market knowledge
Technical knowledge
Competition effects on price
Reinsurer Cedent
Broker Value:
V > Vdi
Value (V )d
Vi
BROKERAGE
BR
OK
ER
AG
E
Vi
Vd = Value direct
= Net value indirect
Broker
Figure 5.1 Brokering Value Triangle
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uncertainty and so lower rates from reinsurers. Where 
cedents are unable to deliver accurate, detailed, up-
to-date information on the risks they are seeking to 
place, reinsurers respond with scepticism. At worst 
they refuse to write the programme. At best, they 
demand additional information and ‘load’ their models 
to relect their uncertainty. While the risk to the cedent 
of overpaying for reinsurance cover is a very real one, 
aggressive pricing from reinsurers, based on poor 
information is not helpful either, as it exposes cedents 
to the risk of a shortfall. As brokers play a critical role in 
helping cedents to structure reinsurance programmes, 
it is critical that they understand their matchmaking 
role in this regard. Re-structuring programmes to 
obscure performance issues or complicate year-
on-year comparison is not doing clients a service. 
By contrast, responding to reinsurers’ information 
concerns in a constructive fashion strengthens 
reinsurers’ conidence in a programme, broadens the 
pool of interested reinsurers, increases capacity, and 
creates room for manoeuvre to lower rates. And that 
is in the cedent’s best interest, both short-term and 
long-term.
Brokers’ responses to these concerns about 
distribution and information quality impact on the 
pricing of programmes. Cedents try to keep pricing 
under control through sophisticated programme 
structures that minimise the price to pay for the desired 
cover. Brokers can assist by helping cedents devise 
structures and choose products that sit comfortably 
with reinsurers. As they deal with many reinsurers, 
brokers understand what does and does not work 
and can help their clients avoid those structures and 
products that naturally reduce the pool of possible 
reinsurers, artiicially reducing capacity, and driving 
up the rates on placements. Where brokers generate 
additional interest in a programme, both through 
the way it is structured and the extent to which they 
improve distribution to interested reinsurers, they 
shift the balance of supply and demand. This ensures 
that incumbents on the programme must remain 
competitive in order to maintain their share. 
Finally, brokers can provide important services that 
are independent of the reinsurance placements 
that were their entrance ticket into the industry. 
This kind of value-added can low from their global 
infrastructure, such as their ability to provide in-
house claims handling services for multiple smaller 
cedents, and their technical knowledge. In 
particular, there is a growing role for brokers to act 
as continuous service providers to both cedents and 
reinsurers, rather than merely as renewal assistants. 
This is particularly important, as ceded premium 
has remained constant, meaning 
that brokers need to consider 
alternative sources of income 
beyond premium. Brokers should 
consider supplementing their 
offering with ancillary services to 
win the right to distribute cedents’ 
programmes. Furthermore, brokers 
should consider branching out into 
alternative services to generate 
revenue independent of any 
placements. Brokers’ infrastructure 
and technical knowledge are the 
key ingredients to this strategy. 
Solvency II compliance, modelling, 
or claims handling are just some 
examples of how brokers can use 
their technical knowledge to sell 
consulting services independent 
of renewals and placements. The 
bigger challenge beyond accessing the expertise 
for these services, however, is the way that they are 
remunerated. As long as the industry stays committed 
to brokerage on placements as the dominant means of 
remuneration, it will be relatively easy to deliver these 
services, but relatively dificult to get paid for them. 
In this sense, the problem for brokers is not so much 
about generating value for the industry, but capturing 
that value and turning it into a proit for themselves.
5.1.2 Cedent expectations of brokers
The starting point of value creation for brokers 
is cedents’ expectations. As shown in Section 
2, cedents come in different types, and so have 
varying needs from and expectations of brokers. 
Understanding these different expectations allows 
brokers to channel their efforts, differentiate how 
different resources are deployed in different client 
segments, and identify the critical ingredients that 
distinguish a ‘global’ broker from the rapidly eroding 
smaller brokers.
As shown in the Broker Service Segmentation Chart 
overleaf (Figure 5.2), there is a cluster of prerequisite 
services that all cedents demand, including market-
speciic knowledge, technical knowledge, a 
distribution channel, and market intelligence. As 
discussed above, the key purpose of the broker-
cedent relationship remains placing the cedent’s 
business: Any broker who does not have a suficient 
distribution channel to access good capacity for a 
variety of lines of business and territories will naturally 
struggle. Successful placement depends on two 
factors: Market-speciic knowledge of the primary 
market and market intelligence on current capacity 
“Brokers need to 
sell themselves 
as providing 
services to their 
clients, because 
their main added 
value is not placing 
the reinsurance 
programme. It’s 
much more about 
how they manage 
Solvency 2 issues, 
do they have to 
buy a traditional 
reinsurance cover 
or do they need 
other financial 
solutions. So they 
are much more 
financial solutions 
provider now than 
just the reinsurance 
placing broker.”  
(Reinsurer)
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and risk appetites in the reinsurance market. Especially 
where programmes are hard to analyse given their 
underlying risks, contextual knowledge of the primary 
market is paramount for preparing information, 
structuring the programme, and broking the deal to 
a variety of reinsurers. Knowing who to approach, 
where to ind extra capacity in the market, and how 
to leverage current market cycles to the beneit of 
the cedent are equally critical. Brokers who under-
perform in this respect put their clients at risk, either by 
overpaying for their cover or ending up with a shortfall. 
Technical knowledge, unsurprisingly, underpins 
brokers’ bread-and-butter business of customising, 
applying, and evaluating vendor models for structuring 
programmes(5). In a world where statistical risk 
modelling is increasingly pervasive, any type of cedent 
expects this service from their broker.
At the other end of the spectrum sits a range of 
services that have varying relevance for different types 
of cedents. Brokers can maximise their value in these 
areas by making sure that they are targeting the right 
services at the right clients; and ceasing those services 
that cost a lot of resources, but generate little client 
value or revenue. 
•	 Pricing support is a low priority for most Global 
Buyers. They have sophisticated tools for pricing 
and structuring programmes and do not need 
brokers to perform these activities. However, they 
do want brokers to provide consultancy, market 
intelligence, and ideas against which to test their 
own tools and analyses. Brokers are also important 
to give internal transparency on these firms’ audit 
and regulatory processes, and to satisfy internal 
policies about pricing of LOC cessions. 
Understanding these specific preferences helps 
brokers to tailor their offering and complement 
existing competences on the part of their clients. By 
contrast, Emerging, local, small Regional and 
Specialty Lines Buyers are likely to be more 
dependent on brokers for analytic capacity and 
structuring programmes. 
•	 While a distribution channel is 
a prerequisite for all brokers, 
the extent of intermediation 
required by different cedents 
changes with their size and 
nature of business. Global 
Buyers often have historical 
direct relationships that 
account for a significant 
amount of their placements 
with reinsurers. While they 
broker a proportion of their 
programmes, a large amount 
is placed directly, because of 
the volume of trade they do 
with a small group of the 
Pricing
Support
Greater scope 
for targeted 
differentiation
Prerequisites 
(expected by 
all cedents)
Structuring
Programme
Extent of 
Intermediation
Market Speciic
Knowledge
Technical
Knowledge
Distribution
Channel
Market
Intelligence
Training
Low Medium High
Regional, Local & 
SL Buyers
Regional, Local & 
SL Buyers
Local & 
SL Buyers
Regional & 
Local Buyers
SL & 
Emerging Buyers
Local, SL &
Emerging Buyers
Local, SL &
Emerging Buyers
Local Buyers
Global & SL
 Buyers
Global Buyers
Global Buyers
Global Buyers
Global Buyers
Global Buyers
Global Buyers
Global Buyers
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Regional Buyers
Regional Buyers
Regional Buyers
Emerging Buyers
Emerging Buyers
Emerging Buyers
Regional &
SL Buyers
Local &
Emerging Buyers
Emerging Buyers
Figure 5.2 Broker Service Segmentation Chart: What do Cedents Expect? 
(Low to high is the strength of the cedent’s need for a particular item from their broker)
“Because of the 
complexity of putting it 
all together - we were 
pulling together a large 
number of underlying 
programmes - we had 
the brokers involved 
effectively structuring 
the deal, presenting 
the information. But in 
a sense they weren’t 
traditionally broking, 
they got a fee for doing 
all the work but they 
weren’t really broking 
per se because the 
distribution channel was 
effectively done direct.”  
(Cedent)
(5) Jarzabkowski et al. 2010.Trading Risks  The value of relationships, models and face-to-face   
 interaction in a global reinsurance market. Executive Report: Insurance Intellectual   
 Capital Initiative.
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biggest reinsurers. While these buyers require 
placement services because their capacity 
programmes are spread across the market, the 
total placement may only comprise a relatively small 
amount of the overall premium ceded. Smaller and 
specialist insurers by, contrast, do not have these 
direct relationships to the same extent and are 
more reliant on brokers to place their business 
across a sufficiently diverse panel of reinsurers. 
•	 Programme structuring is similar. Global Buyers 
have the technical capacity to structure their own 
programmes and often do so together with the key 
reinsurers with whom they maintain direct 
relationships. Here, brokers may provide useful 
comparisons with global peers and support internal 
transparency, thus providing advice for structuring, 
rather than doing the structuring per se. By 
contrast, support with programme structuring is of 
more importance for Regional Players and, in 
particular, for Local and Emerging Market Buyers, 
who may lack the experience and market 
intelligence to structure their programmes so as to 
appeal to a large spread of fragmented reinsurers 
taking their risks. It is these classes of cedents that 
assign the highest importance to these services, 
indicating an area where brokers can add 
substantial value through support with programme 
structure.
•	 Training is of low importance to Global, Specialty 
Lines, and Regional Buyers. They either have 
in-house capacity to address any needs or their 
training needs are too specific to be serviced by 
broker generalists. By contrast, Local Buyers give 
medium and Emerging Buyers high importance to 
training services, welcoming broker support in 
developing their human capital.
These varying service expectations show that cedents 
are not a homogeneous mass and that targeted 
service offerings can unlock substantial value for 
brokers. Being a ‘global’ broker, able to deliver for 
Global Buyers, takes a distinct set of services and 
skills, indicating how consolidation in the broking 
sector matches consolidation in the primary market: 
Only a large, technically capable broker with a globally 
integrated distribution channel can support the needs 
of Global Buyers. Value-generation is easier for other 
classes of cedents, where brokers can more easily 
identify and plug capability gaps. Importantly, the 
sophisticated analytic capacity, business solutions, 
and training that big broking houses can provide, 
means that brokers are increasingly competing with 
many large reinsurers who have historically relied on 
these capabilities as a source of differentiation and 
competitive advantage.
5.1.3 Summarising broker value to cedents
Two insights are important in summarising broker 
value to cedents: First, prerequisite services are safe, 
and indeed necessary, to invest in, as they can be 
deployed across the entire client portfolio. However, as 
any broker needs to provide these 
services as the entry criteria to the 
industry, it is dificult to differentiate 
through them; they allow irms 
to enter the competition, but not 
necessarily to win. By contrast, 
more differentiated services that 
only speciic segments of the 
client population require need 
to be considered more carefully. 
Brokers need to assess whether 
their service portfolio actually 
matches the expectations of their 
client portfolio, and whether these 
services are being deployed in 
a tailored way to both add value to cedents and also 
capture value for brokers.
Second, the prerequisite services of brokered 
reinsurance are also the ones that are most easily 
remunerated through brokerage. Those services 
that are cedent segment-speciic and allow brokers 
to position themselves as ‘specialist’ or ‘global’, 
brokers are, typically independent of placements 
and therefore not covered by brokerage. In 
particular, as Global Buyers both place some of their 
programmes directly and also assume signiicant 
proportions of the risk internally, such services may 
not lead to brokers placing those programmes on 
the open market. This affects their potential for 
 
“We offer our 
opinion and 
advice, we do a 
lot of simulation 
work for them and 
technically analyse 
their programme. 
It is heavily 
administration-
related work; 
hence they use 
brokers.  Very clever 
… but we only 
get remunerated 
through other 
programmes.”  
(Broker)
Implications of cedent 
expectations of brokers
•	 Prerequisite services are safe and necessary to 
invest in, as they can be deployed across the 
entire client portfolio. However, they are not the 
key differentiators within the industry
•	 Prerequisite services are associated with 
placing business and are easily remunerated 
through traditional brokerage
•	 Differentiated services that are required only by 
specific client segments need to be considered 
more carefully. The tailored deployment of such 
distinctive services can enable brokers to 
distinguish themselves
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remuneration via brokerage. Thus, we query whether 
brokerage remains the only or the most suitable form 
of remuneration for all services. However, neither 
cedents nor brokers seem to have established 
a clear position on the best alternative routes for 
remuneration, with the exception of some fee-for-
service in particular markets and on some new global 
or large regional programmes.
5.2 Intermediating reinsurer-cedent fit
Building on the Strategic Partner Matrix in Section 4, 
this section addresses how brokers can add value 
by increasing the it between reinsurers and cedent 
types. We then develop a Broking Partnering Matrix, to 
consider those relationships where brokers may best 
extract value for the services they provide.
5.2.1 Extracting broker value
To maximise their value, brokers should be strategic 
in selecting the relationships that they intermediate. 
Otherwise they may invest effort in facilitating 
relationships that would have come to pass anyway 
and where their value-added is perceived as small or, 
even worse, invest their effort in forging relationships 
that are unlikely to yield value to any party.
In Section 4, we identiied how the strategic positions 
and business orientations of different reinsurer and 
cedent types align, based on a 1-5 star rating. To 
summarise some key points that are relevant to 
brokers’ ability to add value, all reinsurer types can 
write Local and Regional Buyers at some level of it. 
With a large pool of reinsurers genuinely interested in 
this business, brokers’ focus can shift from accessing 
capacity to pressuring price in this segment. However, 
while the segment is proitable, at least for the 
moment, an exclusive reliance on distribution and 
pricing services means that broker margins are likely 
to be squeezed in future. Additionally, consolidation 
may reduce signiicantly these relationships that have 
traditionally relied on brokers. We, therefore, use a red, 
amber and green system in the Broker Matchmaking 
Map (Figure 5.3) to show which relationships are most 
likely to yield value to brokers, and so indicate where 
they should focus their efforts. 
•	 Those relationships where there is minimal fit 
between the expectations and demands of different 
types of cedents and reinsurers are highlighted in 
red. Brokers should steer clear of these 
relationships. No matter what effort they exert, the 
strategic orientations and reinsurance requirements 
of these pairs are so far apart that they will yield little 
value, even with the broker’s help. Trying to 
facilitate these relationships will waste brokers’ time 
and resources.
Global
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Partner
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‘impartial’ services and 
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Value added by increasing 
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Rarely adds value. May turn
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Matching solution providers 
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reinsurer how to evaluate 
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Value added by Interpret 
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distribution and improving 
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Value added where broker 
offers superior distribution 
channel to those of existing 
relationships
Value added by providing 
services that are not 
economic for reinsurer to 
provide
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of those locals that are 
technical and good RoE   
Value added by distribution 
of those locals that are 
technical and good RoE   
Value added through 
distribution 
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market knowledge and 
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deals
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it into a deal but not usually 
attractive  
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into a deal but not usually 
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Value added through distri-
bution, market knowledge 
and technical support  to 
increase attractiveness
Rarely adds value. 
May turn into a deal but 
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Value added by providing 
specialist knowledge  
Rarely adds value. May turn
into a deal but not usually 
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Rarely adds value. May turn
into a deal but not usually 
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Value added through 
distribution and specialist 
knowledge 
Local Emerging Specialty
Figure 5.3 Broker Matchmaking Map
•	 Those services that allow brokers to differentiate 
themselves as ‘global’ brokers are typically 
independent of placements and need to be 
remunerated in alternative ways to traditional 
brokerage 
•	 There is still little clarity in the industry about how 
to charge for such tailored services
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•	 Those relationships where brokers enjoy good 
value-generation potential are indicated in green. 
These are those pairs of cedents and reinsurers 
that gain increased fit through traditional forms of 
intermediation, such as distribution channels and 
the application of technical knowledge. Here 
brokers enjoy the greatest value-adding potential 
by accessing capacity that the cedent is unable to 
access on their own. Enabling additional capacity 
shifts the balance of supply and demand and allows 
brokers to put pressure on prices on their clients’ 
behalf. These areas of matchmaking should form 
part of a brokers’ core business.
•	 Those relationships that are coded amber represent 
different conundrums for brokers about how to add 
value. In some relationships, such as the Portfolio 
Partner and Global Buyer, there is such natural fit 
between the two parties that the perceived value of 
the broker as matchmaker may be minimal. Hence, 
brokers always run the risk that these natural 
partners decide to engage in a direct relationship 
and cut out the broker. Focusing on this type of 
business, therefore, requires an alternative 
approach to value-adding, based on differentiated 
services that may not result in large placements or 
be remunerated through brokerage. Other areas 
that are coded amber represent an alternative 
challenge for value-adding, largely based on 
developing reinsurers’ abilities to write particular 
types of cedents for which they may lack the 
requisite technical skills, or for which they have a 
lower risk appetite due to their underwriting 
processes. For example, Patchwork Partners do 
not have ideal fit with Global Buyers, because they 
lack the scale and, usually, the appropriate 
exposure management tools, to write multi-territory 
programmes. Brokers will thus need to support the 
reinsurer side of the relationship in order to increase 
fit.
A close look reveals that the majority of the matrix is 
actually not green, but amber. The key insight is that 
brokers need to work on transforming these amber 
relationships into more promising alternatives. The 
strategic implications for brokers are unpacked below. 
5.2.2 Extracting value from matchmaking
Just as reinsurers work hard to diversify their portfolios, 
so brokers should take a careful look at who they 
count among their clients. Focusing on those clients 
where brokers can add substantial value through 
matchmaking with reinsurers, and where they also 
have the competence to do so, is critical. 
We develop a Broker Target Business Chart (Figure 
5.4) that brokers can use to identify core clients, based 
on two dimensions: Broking opportunity and broking 
competence. The broking opportunity dimension 
denotes a client that has value-generating potential 
for the broker. Typically, broking opportunities arise 
where a broker is able to improve a cedent’s it with a 
particular type of reinsurer: The brokers’ matchmaking 
function. Where broking opportunities are high, 
brokers are in a good position to facilitate a renewal 
placement and reap rewards in the form of brokerage. 
In situations where cedent and reinsurer would have 
struggled to come together on their own accord, both 
will appreciate the broker’s value added and perceive 
good value for money. Broking competence refers to 
the speciic skills and services that a broker can bring 
to any cedent, which will enable that cedent to improve 
their access to capacity. As previously noted, different 
cedents have different requirements of brokers, so 
that a blanket approach to skills and services will not 
necessarily mean that all broking competences can 
also yield value in broking opportunities. The Broker 
Target Business Chart, thus, allows us to systematize 
the red, amber, green relationships identiied in the 
Broker Matchmaking Map. 
Those cedent-reinsurer combinations where brokers 
can add maximum value by unlocking capacity 
that cedents could not access on their own should 
constitute brokers’ ‘Heartland’ business. Here, they 
enjoy a strong opportunity to add value and they have 
the competence to do so, as their services, such as 
structuring, pricing and information processing, help to 
match cedents with suitable reinsurers. The strategic 
implication is that brokers have to protect their 
Heartland business from competitors.
(6) Adapted from Goold, M., Campbell, A. and Alexander, M. (1994) ‘Corporate Level Strategy:   
 Creating Value in the Multi-business Company’, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
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By contrast, constellations 
in which there is no broking 
opportunity because the respective 
parties’ strategic orientations 
are too different to be brought 
together, and where brokers lack 
the requisite competence for 
matchmaking between them, are 
‘Aliens’. The strategic implication 
is that brokers should avoid these 
situations. 
Situations where the broker feels 
they have good competence in 
an area, but there is such natural 
it between reinsurer and cedent 
that they can easily do the deal 
without a broker, constitute 
‘Ballast’ for the broker. The two 
parties are so well aligned that brokers cannot 
add much value through their traditional broking 
competences, such as distribution and technical 
support. As such relationships are unlikely to facilitate 
a placement and earn brokerage, the strategic 
implication is that brokers need to ind a way to 
deploy their competence in new services that are 
remunerated independently. While there is no broking 
opportunity in facilitating these relationships, there may 
be ample opportunity in ancillary services, as noted in 
previous suggestions about fee-for-service with Global 
Buyers. Additionally, helping a reinsurer to strategically 
re-position may be an area through which brokers can 
generate revenues through service fees. There are still 
good opportunities to be found in “amber” areas of the 
map, as long as brokers recognize the necessity to act 
and do not become complacent in these areas. 
Finally, those situations that present a good broking 
opportunity, but brokers simply lack the competence 
to facilitate them, constitute ‘Value traps’. For 
example, in some areas a broking irm may lack 
access to market, due to barriers to entry from their 
competitors, or a lack of market speciic knowledge 
about local regulations or conditions. As brokers 
are, thus, unable to either produce business in such 
markets or place it convincingly with reinsurers, 
cedents will work with a different broker that has the 
required competences. The strategic implication is that 
brokers either exit these markets, so not wasting time 
and resources trying to penetrate a closed market, 
or they address these situations quickly, ideally by 
developing or acquiring those skills that are required to 
take advantage of the broking opportunity.
5.3 Conclusion: Implications of change for brokers
These analyses indicate a number of critical points for 
brokers to consider for their current and future position 
in the reinsurance industry.
First, brokers who are over-exposed to Local Buyers 
as key clients are vulnerable to increasing competition 
over those players remaining after consolidation. 
Second, technical, specialist, and market knowledge 
can underpin services that generate value to both 
cedents and reinsurers. A one-sided orientation as a 
cedent service provider is screening out substantial 
value-generation and revenue potential from services 
to reinsurers. Services to reinsurers can prove to be 
doubly beneicial, as they may generate revenue and 
facilitate future services to cedents.
Third, brokers’ distribution networks need to keep 
pace with the evolution of global and regional cedents. 
While the leading brokers increasingly have critical 
mass and global reach, more globally integrated 
operations can greatly improve brokers’ position in 
the market, helping reinsurers to access regional 
business, and broadening the capital pool for those 
regional cedents. To this end, however, brokers 
need to overcome their localised structures and set 
themselves up as globally integrated entities.
Fourth, brokers should protect those Heartland 
cedent-reinsurer relationships where they have the 
opportunity to improve it, as illustrated by the Broker 
Matchmaking Map and Broker Target Business Chart. 
Fifth, with broker value-added increasingly occurring 
independently of placements, brokerage is a 
problematic form of remuneration that needs to 
be addressed in order to ensure that brokers are 
rewarded for their services.
Key implications: Broker value
•	 The traditional Heartland space for brokers, of 
matching Local and Regional Buyers to all but 
the largest Portfolio Partner reinsurers is still 
profitable, but some sections are eroding.
•	 Brokers need to both protect their Heartland 
business but also develop new competences to 
access other business opportunities, which are 
likely to fall outside traditional placement 
services.
•	 The revenue streams and business models for 
these additional opportunities will need to be 
developed alongside the traditional brokerage 
business. 
“The clients actually 
value the role of the 
broker increasingly 
because they 
use the broker 
as their R&D a lot 
of the time. With 
some very large 
customers, we give 
them everything 
for a fee, rather 
than traditional 
brokerage. But 
have we got to the 
stage where we’re 
measuring the 
intellectual capital 
appropriately?  
Probably not, we’re 
probably giving it 
away for free.”  
(Broker)
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6. Conclusion: A word of caution
This report has highlighted a number of changes in the 
global reinsurance landscape and their implications for 
cedents, reinsurers, and brokers. In particular, we have 
noted how consolidation is driving change as a few 
key players who transact business on a global scale 
increasingly dominate the market. These changes are 
accompanied by a shift in reinsurance purchasing, 
and, consequently, reinsurance premium, from 
local programmes to bundled global programmes. 
It is important that reinsurers, cedents, and brokers 
recognize some of the more sombre implications of 
some of these trends. We, thus, end on a cautionary 
note. 
Bundling risk is eficient and adds value to cedents. 
However, it should be treated with caution and 
observed carefully for the following reasons. First, such 
risks are remote from the speciic primary insurance 
markets being covered, and so may not easily relect 
the current cycles and state of development within 
those different markets. This means that the deep 
knowledge of speciic markets that typically underpins 
underwriting judgement is less applicable. Secondly, 
transparency is reduced, as it is dificult for reinsurers 
to tease out the assumptions about capital eficiency 
and diversiication that underpin bundled risks. While 
complex forms of eficient frontier modelling may 
underpin the bundling, the reinsurance underwriters 
who assume the risk do not easily understand the 
assumptions on which such modelling is based. 
Third, bundling increases the global connectivity of 
reinsurance markets and, with it, the potential for 
surprise exposures that have global ramiications, as 
indicated by the supply chain interruptions incurred 
in the 2011 Thai loods. These three factors, which 
increase complexity and connectivity in inancial risk 
transfer and obscure professional judgement, have a 
poor history in other inancial sectors. 
The reinsurance industry has avoided the seduction 
of models thus far, retaining underwriter judgement 
alongside increasingly technical evaluation of risk. 
It is important not to lose sight of this rare quality in 
a capital market. In particular, reinsurance is based 
on the transfer of risk between two parties, both of 
whom are risk carriers. That is, reinsurance risks 
are not traded-off ad ininitum, but are speciically 
exchanged between a buyer and a seller for the 
inancial protection of both parties. It is undoubtedly 
important to support judgement with technical 
analysis, and to generate greater capital eficiency for 
all players. However, we urge the reinsurance industry 
to be cautious in embracing complexity and global 
connectivity, and to retain its focus on judgement.
Key points of caution
•	 Reinsurance bundling increases the complexity 
of financial models and global connectivity of 
markets
•	 Increased complexity and connectivity in 
financial risk transfer have a poor history in the 
banking sector
•	 We urge the reinsurance industry to be cautious 
in embracing complexity and global 
connectivity, which predisposes an increasing 
reliance on financial models, and to retain its 
focus on judgement
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Appendix: Participating organizations
We would like to thank the 58 irms that participated in this global study.
Of the 17 participating irms in Phase 1 of this study (2009-2010), the following eleven agreed to be named: 
- Amlin
- Aon Benield 
- Ariel Re
- Axis Reinsurance 
- Brit Insurance
- Hiscox 
- Kiln Group 
- Liberty Syndicate Management 
- Talbot Underwriting 
- Tokio Millennium Re 
- Validus Re
Of the 11 reinsurers who participated in Phase 2 (2011-2012), the following seven agreed to be named: 
- Amlin Re Europe
- Asia Capital Re
- Catlin Re Switzerland
- Mapfre Re
- Munich Re
- Partner Re
- SCOR 
 
Of the 37 brokers and cedents who participated in Phase 2, the following 29 agreed to be named: 
- Achmea Reinsurance Company N.V.
- Aon Benield
- Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance
- Allianz Re
- Amlin plc
- AXA
- Coface
- Euler Hermes
- Farmers Mutual Hails Ins. Co. of Iowa
- FM Global
- Hiscox
- IAG
- Iffco Tokio General Insurance
- ING
- Jubilee General
- Liberty Mutual
- Mapfre
- Menora Mivtachim Insurance Ltd. 
- Overseas Assurance Corporation
- Oriental Insurance
- Pioneer Insurance
- QBE
- Suncorp
- Tokio Marine Nichido Fire
- Tugu Pratama
- Vereinigte Hagelversicherung VVaG
- Vienna Insurance Group
- VVAA
- Zurich 
 
